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I. INTRODUCTION
T he creation of a new court to handle the claims against the United
States that were previously decided by the United States Court of
Claims was necessitated by the merger of the Court of Claims and Court
of Customs and Patent Appeals into the United States Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit. The establishment of a new United States Claims
Court was less a primary goal of the Federal Courts Improvement Act of
19821 than it was a byproduct of the desire to create a new federal circuit
court of appeals to hear appeals in defined classes of cases on a nation-
wide basis. Perhaps because attention was focused primarily on the Court
of Appeals, Congress did not give sufficient attention to constitutional
*Professor of Law, Cleveland-Marshall College of Law, Cleveland State University. B.A.,
Reed College; J.D., George Washington University; LL.M., Yale University. The author
wishes to acknowledge the research assistance of Dennis Matejka, Cleveland-Marshall Col-
lege of Law, class of 1983.
' Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25 (1982) (codified throughout sections of titles 2, 5, 6, 10,
15, 16, 18, 19, 22, 25, 26, 28, 30, 31, 33, 35, 40, 41, 42, 44, 45, and 50 app. U.S.C. (1982))
[hereinafter cited as Federal Courts Improvement Act].
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requirements in structuring the new Claims Court and providing for a
transfer of duties to it. This article will deal with two major constitutional
problems that have resulted from the creation of the Claims Court.
The first issue is the constitutionality of the appointment of existing
Court of Claims Commissioners to be judges on the Claims Court during
a four-year "transition" period. Congress was not given appointment
power by the Constitution of the United States; on the contrary, that
power was vested in the President by article II. By legislatively designat-
ing the persons who are to serve as judges on the new court, Congress has
usurped the presidential appointment power.
The second issue relates to the constitutional status of the Claims
Court. The Court of Claims which it replaces was created under arti-
cle III of the Constitution, and the judges on it were therefore entitled to
life tenure (during good behavior) and salaries that could not be reduced
during their terms in office. The new Claims Court, on the other hand, is
designated by Congress as an "article I" court; the judges are to be ap-
pointed for only fifteen year terms, and their salaries are subject to con-
trol by Congress. The new court exercises full judicial authority, however,
and has jurisdiction over cases of national importance in which the gov-
ernment of the United States has a great financial stake. Although the
analysis of this issue is far from simple, this author concludes that Con-
gress has exceeded its constitutional authority by failing to comply with
the requirements of article III of the Constitution in establishing the
Claims Court.
II. THE APPOINTMENT POWER
The first constitutional question raised by the Federal Courts Improve-
ment Act of 1982 relates to the initial appointment of judges to the new
article I United States Claims Court. The problem centers around one of
the least challenged or litigated clauses of the United States Constitution:
the appointment power.2
A. History of the Appointment Power
The decision to vest the appointment power in the President was con-
sidered by the Founding Fathers to be an essential part of the whole
2 This clause provides:
[The President] shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the
Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, Judges of
the supreme Court, and all other Officers of the United States, whose Appoint-
ments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by the
Law; but the Congress may by Law vest the Appointment of such inferior Officers,
as they think proper, in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads
of Departments.




scheme of separation of powers. The constitutional division of the powers
of national government among the legislative, executive and judicial
branches was a protection against government corruption and the use of.
undue influence.' Those who attended the Constitutional Convention in
1787 viewed the separation of powers as a check against government tyr-
anny." Their task was to allocate the appointment power to one of the
three branches, while still providing safeguards to ensure that appointees
would be qualified and deserving of public office.
At the Convention, James Madison led a contingent in favor of vesting
the power of appointment in the President alone, without requiring the
concurrence of the Senate. Charles Pinckney and others were in favor of
vesting the power of appointment in the Senate alone. Oliver Ellsworth
contended that the initiative in making appointments should be with the
Senate and that the President should be given only the power to negative
appointments. The report of John Rutledge's committee, which was the
body intended to reconcile the different views advanced in the Conven-
tion, also favored the making of appointments by the Senate. The final
compromise was that the Executive should make appointments, with the
advice and consent of the Senate.
5
Madison summed up the effect of this power division as follows:
The powers relative to offices are partly Legislative and partly
Executive. The Legislature creates the office, defines the powers,
limits its duration and annexes a compensation. This done, the
Legislative power ceases. They ought to have nothing to do with
designating the man to fill the office. That I conceive to be of an
Executive nature. Although it be qualified in the Constitution, I
would not extend or strain that qualification beyond the limits
precisely fixed for it.
We ought always to consider the Constitution with an eye to
the principles upon which it was founded. In this point of view,
we shall readily conclude that if the Legislature determines the
powers, the honors, and the emoluments of an office, we should
be insecure if they were to designate the officer also. The nature
of things restrains and confines the Legislative and Executive au-
thorities in this respect; and hence it is that the Constitution stip-
ulates for the independence of each branch of the Government.'
The importance of vesting the appointment power in the President was
emphasized by Alexander Hamilton, who wrote:
3 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 56 (M. Farrand ed. 1966) [herein-
after cited as THE RECORDS].
THE FEDERALIST No. 47, at 299 (J. Madison) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961).
THE RECORDS, supra note 3, at 50-59. The Supreme Court thoroughly considered these
debates in Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 120-37 (1976).
6 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 581-82 (J. Gales ed. 1789).
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The sole and undivided responsibility of one man will naturally
beget a livelier sense of duty and a more exact regard to reputa-
tion. He will, on this account, feel himself under stronger obliga-
tions, and more interested to investigate with care and qualities
requisite to the stations to be filled, and to prefer with impartial-
ity the persons who may have the fairest pretentions to
them....
A single well-directed man, by a single understanding, cannot
be distracted and warped by [a] diversity of views, feelings, and
interests, which frequently distract and warp the resolutions of a
collective body.'
The requirement that all officers of the United States be appointed
according to article II, section 2, clause 2 of the Constitution has been
consistently upheld in the courts.' However, the size of the United States
and the extent of its government made it necessary for the President to
be given some flexibility and assistance in the appointment process.9 This
was permitted by article II which provided that Congress could vest some
appointment power in courts of law or "Heads of Departments." Even
when delegated in this manner, however, the appointment power is still
indirectly controlled by the Executive. Appointments made by the courts
and department heads are subject to various enumerated restrictions.
First, article II, section 2 allows the appointment power to be vested in
"Heads of Departments" which has been strictly interpreted to mean
"Cabinet members." This provision acts as a restriction on the number of
people eligible to be vested with the appointment power. In modern polit-
ics, it also creates an assurance that appointments will be made in accor-
dance with the President's desires, if not his explicit requests, a heavily
influencing factor.10 Second, before the "Cabinet member" interpretation
of "Departments Head" was applied, the Supreme Court had indicated
that the power could only be vested for appointments made within the
limited scope of a department head's own work. This prevented Congress
from vesting the appointment power in persons other than the President
to any significant extent.1 Last, even in situations where the appoint-
ment power has been vested in others, the President has been given the
authority to request a written opinion from the court of law or depart-
ment head concerned, asking about the qualifications of the new ap-
THE FEDERALIST No. 76, at 492 (A. Hamilton) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961).
' Steele v. United States, 267 U.S. 505 (1925); Burnap v. United States, 252 U.S. 512
(1920); Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803); Deviny v. Campbell, 194 F.2d
876 (D.C. Cir. 1952); United States v. Musgrave. 293 F. 203 (D. Neb. 1923). These cases
provide support for the view that the principle of separation of powers is one of the funda-
mental protective principles of our government and will be strictly upheld.
9 Hobson v. Hansen, 265 F. Supp. 902 (D.D.C. 1967).
"0 Brooks v. United States, 33 F. Supp. 68 (E.D.N.Y. 1939).




pointee. This procedure assures that the President will maintain a close
check over all appointments of United States officials.'2
B. Transitional Provisions for the United States Claims Court
The permanent appointment process that is provided for the Claims
Court in the Federal Courts Improvement Act is in full compliance with
article II, section 2. Section 105 of the legislation 13 states that the Presi-
dent shall appoint sixteen article I judges to serve on the Claims Court,
with the advice and consent of the Senate.
The constitutional problem arises in the transitional provisions of the
Act, specifically in section 167(a)"' which states that, notwithstanding
section 171(a), the Court of Claims commissioners who are serving in
that capacity on October 1, 1982, will automatically become judges of the
new Claims Court. These former commissioners had never been ap-
pointed by the President; they had been appointed by the judges of the
former Court of Claims.1 5 As such, they were subordinate officials of an
article III court. In their new capacity, however, they become judges of an
entirely new article I court, created by a constitutional power Congress
presumed it possessed. In effect, the Congress has usurped the presiden-
tial power of appointment with respect to the initial judicial appoint-
ments of judges to the Claims Court.
There is no indication in the record of the hearings on the Federal
Courts Improvement Act that Congress ever addressed the possibility
that it was creating constitutional problems by making these transitional
appointments." The House Report attempted to rationalize the transi-
tional appointments provision by saying that it would "merely delay the
date on which the President has power to . . .appoint the judges of the
12 United States v. Germaine, 99 U.S. 508, 511 (1878).
13 Federal Courts Improvement Act, § 105(a), 28 U.S.C. § 171.
14 Id. § 167(a), 28 U.S.C. § 171 note.
,5 28 U.S.C. § 792 (1976 & Supp. V 1981), repealed by Federal Courts Improvement Act,
§ 121(b), 96 Stat. 25, 34.
16 Congress adopted the theory that no new judicial positions were being created by the
Federal Courts Improvement Act. Yet the entire purpose of the legislation was to create a
new court system that would be more efficient. Three factual distinctions support the the-
ory that the Act actually did create new positions. (1) Powers of the new Claims Court
judges were greater than those possessed by Court of Claims commissioners, since they
could now issue final judgments and other binding orders. (2) Jurisdiction of the new Court
of Appeals for the Federal Circuit was broader than any of the judges transferred to it had
previously experienced, due to the merger of the business of the former Court of Claims and
the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals. (3) There was an automatic raise in salary of
Claims Court judges based on their new positions. Industrial Innovation and Patent and
Copyright Law Amendments: Hearings on H.R. 6033 Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil
Liberties and the Administration of Justice of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 96th Cong., 2d
Sess. 722 (1980) (testimony of Judge Friedman, Chief Judge, United States Court of
Claims).
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Claims Court.' 1 The fact remains, however, that the appointment power
is vested in the President by the Constitution, as well as by the Federal
Courts Improvement Act itself. There are no provisions in the Constitu-
tion which give Congress the power to appoint judicial officers of the
United States. 8
These actions by the 97th Congress are also inconsistent with the his-
torical role of the Congress in restructuring the federal court system.
Three examples will illustrate that it is possible for Congress to enact
transitional provisions that conform to the appointment provisions of the
Constitution.
1) In 1969 Congress enacted legislation which created the United
States Tax Court. 9 The transition from the former Board of Tax Appeals
to the United States Tax Court was made by elevating the former person-
nel to judicial seats on the new court. Since the Board of Tax Appeals
had been an independent board and part of the Executive branch, all of
the members elevated to Tax Court judgeships had already been ap-
pointed by the President.2 This contrasts with the transitional provisions
for the Claims Court judges, who have never been submitted to the presi-
dential appointment process.
2) The Federal Magistrates Act of 197921 is an example of Congress
vesting the appointment power in the courts of law. The Act provided
that federal magistrates were to be appointed by the judges of the United
States district courts.2 2 The transitional measure provided that all cur-
rent United States commissioners were eligible to serve as United States
magistrates. It was not a legislative appointment. Rather, each commis-
sioner was required to undergo a reappointment process, with a unani-
mous vote needed of all the district court judges in the district where the
'7 H.R. REP. No. 312, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 26 (1981).
18 Actions of the Congress in formulating the new court structure demonstrated a strong
intent to exercise control over the Claims Court judicial seats. The committee stated its
expectation that the President would feel a sense of obligation and reappoint the sitting
commissioners when their terms expired. H.R. REP. No. 312, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 25 (1981).
Another indication that Congress may have tried to diminish the role of the President in
making appointments to the Claims Court occurred in connection with deciding the proce-
dure for selecting the chief judge of the new court. The final decision, however, was to vest
the power of appointment in the President. Federal Courts Improvement Act, § 105(a),
28 U.S.C. § 171(b).
" Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, 83 Stat. 487 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.).
"0 Act of June 2, 1924, ch. 234, 43 Stat. 253, 336 (current version at 26 U.S.C. § 7443(b)
(1976)). Although the Tax Court legislation was held to be constitutional, in Stix Friedman
& Co. v. Coyle, 467 F.2d 474 (8th Cir. 1972), the issue of the appointment process was not
raised.
2, Pub. L. No. 96-82, 93 Stat. 643 (1979) (current version at 28 U.S.C. §9 631-639
(1982)).




new magistrate was to serve.2 3 The same protection could have been pro-
vided for the new Claims Court. If the Act creating the Claims Court
aimed to provide higher quality and more independent personnel through
presidential appointments, there is no reason or logical explanation why
the process could not have been instituted at the outset of the new court.
3) The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 1 was an attempt to restruc-
ture the bankruptcy procedures of the United States District Courts. Al-
though the Act was declared unconstitutional in Northern Pipeline Con-
struction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co.,25 one of the provisions of the
Bankruptcy Act which was not specifically declared unconstitutional by
the Supreme Court was the transitional process whereby former bank-
ruptcy referees were elevated to the status of bankruptcy judges. How-
ever, one cannot conclude from this that the Court expressly approved
the transitional measures, since the very complex transitional process,
which was to extend over a period of two years, received only passing
mention by Justice Brennan, who wrote the plurality opinion. He said
merely:
The Act provides for a transition period before the new provi-
sions take full effect in April, 1984. . . . During the transition pe-
riod, previously existing Bankruptcy courts continue in exis-
tence. . . . Incumbent bankruptcy referees, who served six-year
terms for compensation subject to adjustment by Congress, are to
serve as bankruptcy judges until March 31, 1984, or until their
successors take office. . . . During this period they are empow-
ered to exercise essentially all of the jurisdiction and powers dis-
cussed above."
The Court's apparent lack of concern for possible constitutional problems
in the transitional process probably is attributable to the fact that the
issue was not raised during the bankruptcy court litigation, and so it was
not presented to the Court for consideration.2 7 In addition, the Court had
23 Id.
214 Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (1978) (current version at 11 U.S.C. § 101-151326
(Supp. V 1981)).
25 __ U.S. -, 102 S.Ct. 2858 (1982).
26 Id. at -, 102 S.Ct. at 2863 (citations omitted).
27 It is not necessary for the issue of constitutionality to be raised in the lower court
proceedings in order for a challenge to be made at the Supreme Court level in this instance.
In Lamar v. United States, 241 U.S. 103 (1916), a constitutional objection to the judge hear-
ing the case was raised for the first time in the Supreme Court, on the ground that an inter-
circuit assignment of judges violated the President's appointment power. The Supreme
Court decided the case on its merits.
Lamar was consistent with American Constr. Co. v. Jacksonville, T. & K.W. Ry., 148 U.S.
372 (1893), which held that such issues can be entertained, even though not raised in lower
courts, because they are "jurisdictional." Id. at 386-87. See Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S.
530, 536 (1962).
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no compelling reason to decide the issue because it was prepared to hold
that the bankruptcy court was unconstitutional on other grounds.
Even if Justice Brennan's brief mention of the transitional provisions
was to be construed as tacit approval by the Court, those provisions can
still be distinguished from the transitional measures adopted in the
Claims Court legislation. Congress created the bankruptcy courts as "ad-
juncts" to the United States district courts. As Justice Brennan pointed
out in his opinion, they were not created as article I courts. Although
their designation as "adjunct" to the district courts did not save them
from a charge of possessing powers that could constitutionally be con-
ferred only on article III courts, it was clear that Congress did not mean
to withdraw them entirely from the article III judicial system, as it has
done with the Claims Court.
Another distinguishing factor is that the Bankruptcy Reform Act of
1978 was not intended to take full effect until March 31, 1984. The legis-
lation emphasized that the transitional measures were temporary working
procedures. In contrast, the Claims Court legislation took effect immedi-
ately, and the former commissioners were elevated to their judicial seats
on the effective date of the new court, October 1, 1982.28 Yet another
difference is in the transitional provisions. During the Bankruptcy Act's
transitional period, vacancies that occurred by reason of death, disability,
removal or other reasons were to be filled by appointments of the district
court judges, following section 34 of the former Act as though it had not
been repealed.2 9 In contrast, the Claims Court legislation took effect im-
18 Although § 171 of the Act took effect along with the rest of the Claims Court legisla-
tion on October 1, 1982, it did not really allow the President an opportunity to deny eleva-
tion to article I judge status of any of the existing Court of Claims commissioners. This is
because of the provision in § 167(a) of the Act, which states:
Notwithstanding the provisions of section 171(a) of title 28, United States
Code, as amended by this Act, a commissioner of the United States Court of
Claims serving immediately prior to the effective date of this Act shall become a
judge of the United States Claims Court on the effective date of this Act.
Federal Courts Improvement Act, § 167(a), 28 U.S.C. § 171 note. In addition, § 167(b) may
have secured to all the former commissioners who were thus elevated to Claims Court judge-
ships a minimum period in their new offices before they can be displaced by presidential
appointees (unless they voluntarily resign, retire, or leave for other reasons). Section 167(b)
states:
Notwithstanding the provisions of section 172(a) of title 28, United States
Code, as amended by this Act, the initial term of office of a person who becomes a
judge of the United States Claims Court under subsection (a) of this section shall
expire fifteen years after the date of his or her employment with the United
States Court of Claims, or on October 1, 1986, whichever occurs earlier. Any such
judge shall continue in office until a successor is sworn or until reappointed.
Id. § 167(b), 28 U.S.C. § 171 note.
29
Except as otherwise provided in this subsection or in section 407 of this Act, mat-
ters relating to the office of United States bankruptcy judges shall continue to be




mediately, since the predecessor Court of Claims was abolished and its
judges elevated to the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit. There was no real "transition period," merely a legislative promo-
tion of existing commissioners to the status of article I judges. Nor did
Congress attempt to make the Claims Court an "adjunct" to an arti-
cle III court.
C. Congressional Usurpation
The small amount of case law concerning the limits of Congress' power
to participate in the appointment process indicates that "lateral" trans-
fers are an exception to the constitutional requirement. In lateral trans-
fers, officials from one office or function are transferred to another, pro-
vided they have initially been appointed to office by the President. °
The leading case is Shoemaker v. United States,31 decided in 1893.
Here Congress had statutorily appointed certain designated officials to a
commission it created to study the use of eminent domain in the District
of Columbia. The plaintiff challenged the constitutionality of the com-
mission because its officers had not been appointed by the President. The
Court upheld the commission on the ground that though its members had
not been appointed specifically to this commission by the President, they
had been appointed by him to other positions with similar duties. The
Court concluded that the congressional designation of the commission
members was an acceptable lateral transfer from one office to another.
The appointments by Congress of the former Court of Claims commis-
sioners to a new article I Claims Court cannot be justified under the
Shoemaker exception, because the commissioners were never appointed
to office by the President. That their duties in the new positions may be
similar to those they carried out before is irrelevant because the constitu-
tional objection is not to their qualifications, but to the usurpation by
Congress of the President's power of appointment.
The Supreme Court's 1927 decision in Springer v. Government of the
the Bankruptcy Act as such Act existed on September 30, 1979.
The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, tit. iv, § 404(d), 28 U.S.C. prec. § 151 note (1982).
'o The lateral transfer exception was used in creating the United States Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit:
The judges of the United States Court of Claims and of the United States Court
of Customs and Patent Appeals in regular active service on the effective date of
this Act [Oct. 1, 1982] shall continue in office as judges of the United States
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.
Id. § 165, 28 U.S.C. § 44 note. These transfers differ from the Claims Court appointments
because the Court of Claims and Court of Customs and Patent Appeals judges were already
properly appointed article III judges. Moreover, they appeared to be at the same level as
appellate judges, even though they had some trial responsibilities in their former courts.
Their transfers seem to fall within the Shoemaker exception.
31 147 U.S. 282 (1893).
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Philippine Islands2 provides an example of an appointment by legisla-
tion where the appointees were not originally chosen by the executive. At
the time of this decision, the Phillipine Islands were governed under the
law of the Phillipine Organic Act, which was modeled after the United
States Constitution. The Phillipine government was divided into three
branches with explicit separation of powers. Thus, even though the case
did not arise under the United States Constitution, it provides a useful
parallel.
The Springer case arose because the Phillipine legislature statutorily
created a committee to exercise voting powers of government-owned stock
in a coal company and a bank. The legislation provided that these com-
mittee members were to be appointed by the President of the Senate and
the Speaker of the House. The Supreme Court held that the legislature's
power to make laws did not include authority to appoint the officers
charged with the duty of enforcing the laws. The appointment power
rested with the executive alone. The Court ruled:
Not having the power of appointment, unless expressly granted or
incidental to its powers, the legislature cannot engraft executive
duties upon a legislative office, since that would be to usurp the
power of appointment by indirection; though the case might be
different if the additional duties were devolved upon an ap-
pointee of the executive.3 s
The issue of legislative attempts to appoint government officials arose
more recently in Buckley v. Valeo.3 4 In the Federal Election Campaign
Act of 1971,' 5 Congress created the Federal Election Commission. Re-
sponsibility for appointing members to the Commission was divided
among the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House, the Secre-
tary of State, the Clerk of the House and the President. The Supreme
Court held the Act unconstitutional, finding it a clear attempt on the part
of Congress to usurp the presidential appointment power and to vest it in
others.
Buckley can be distinguished from the problem presented by the
Claims Court legislation. In Buckley, Congress delegated the power of ap-
pointment to persons other than the President, while in the Claims Court
legislation, the legislative Act itself makes the appointments, while con-
ferring power of future appointments on the President. But the distinc-
tion does not appear to have any constitutional significance. The Consti-
tution does not envision even small, temporary usurpations of the
President's power by the Congress.
" 277 U.S. 189 (1927).
13 Id. at 202.
- 424 U.S. 1 (1975).
" Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3 (1972) (codified in scattered sections of titles 2, 18, 47




An argument might be made that the temporary appointments were
within Congress' power under the necessary and proper clause of the Con-
stitution.36 This argument was made in Buckley, but the Supreme Court
rejected it: "[Congress may not] vest in itself, or in its officers, the au-
thority to appoint officers of the United States when the Appointment
Clause by clear implication prohibits it from doing so.' '37 The same rea-
soning would apply to the Claims Court. The necessary and proper clause
does not give Congress the power to violate the express terms of the
Constitution.
This problem could be resolved by the President either putting the for-
mer commissioners now serving as article I judges through the presiden-
tial appointment process or having replacements appointed in their
stead.38 The President already has appointed some judges to the new
court. If all the judges were properly appointed by the President with the
advice and consent of the Senate, this constitutional issue would be moot,
except for possible questions concerning the validity of the current
judges' decisions. However, the settlement of this issue would not resolve
the next constitutional problem created by the Claims Court.
III. CONSTITUTIONAL STATUS OF THE CLAIMS COURT
The second constitutional issue raised by the new Claims Court con-
cerns its status as a court and the status of its judges. By the express
terms of the Act, the Claims Court is an "Article I" court.39 This signifies
the intent of Congress not to be constrained by the provisions of arti-
cle III of the Constitution in creating this court.
Article III states that Congress may create inferior federal courts and
that their judges shall serve "during good behavior," with salary pro-.
tected against reduction during their terms of office." ' The Constitution's
draftsmen considered tenure and protected salary essential to the inde-
36 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18. The Congress shall have power "[t]o make all Laws
which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and
all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in
any Department or Officer thereof." Id.
31 424 U.S. at 135.
" The suggestion that the President could proceed to make his own appointments to the
Claims Court, notwithstanding the fact that Court of Claims commissioners were elevated to
those positions by the Act, is based on the premise that the temporary appointments made
by Congress are unconstitutional and may be disregarded by the President. See supra note
28. The further assumption is that the unconstitutional temporary appointment provision is
severable from the permanent appointment powers granted to the President and that the
Claims Court is held to be in other respects constitutional. If the argument made in Part III
of this article is accepted, that the legislation creating the Claims Court violates article III
of the Constitution, then the proper exercise of the President's power would not save the
new court.
39 Federal Courts Improvement Act, § 105(a), 28 U.S.C. § 171(a).
40 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
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pendence and integrity of the federal judiciary, which might otherwise be
susceptible to the political control or influence of the executive and legis-
lative branches. The judges of the new Claims Court, however, will not
have these salary and tenure protections; they will be appointed by the
President to fifteen-year terms, and their salaries will be under the direct
control of Congress."1 This section of the article will discuss whether Con-
gress has exceeded its constitutional authority in so constituting the
Claims Court.42
A. The Marathon Case
The precise constitutional question raised by the Claims Court legisla-
tion has not been addressed previously by the United States Supreme
Court. A recent decision of the Court, however, Northern Pipeline Con-
struction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co.,"3 involved similar issues raised
by the 1978 Bankruptcy Reform Act. There the Court ruled that bank-
ruptcy courts created by the 1978 legislation had been given judicial
power which constitutionally could be exercised in the federal system
only by courts conforming to the requirements of article III. The similar-
ity of the issue in the two pieces of legislation makes it reasonable to
suppose that the Court might decide to examine the constitutionality of
the Claims Court when it has a case before it raising the issue. Where the
constitutional question is one of jurisdiction and judicial power, the Court
may raise the issue on its own motion, provided a judgment of the Claims
Court is otherwise before it for review.
The discussion of this historically and theoretically complicated prob-
lem should begin with the Marathon case even though Marathon does
not directly concern the Claims Court and its predecessors. Analytical ap-
proaches to questions of constitutional law tend to change over time, re-
flecting differing perspectives demanded by changing governmental con-
cerns and national needs. The need to re-examine is particularly acute in
the area of constitutional separation of powers, where the vast expansion
of national legislative and executive power in recent decades is reflected
in the startling proliferation of regulatory legislation and increased fed-
4 Federal Courts Improvement Act, § 105(a), 28 U.S.C. § 172.
41 Congress is not required to create inferior federal courts; nor is it required to vest all of
the judicial power of the United States in those it does create. Lockerty v. Phillips, 319 U.S.
182, 187 (1943); P. BATOR, P. MISHKIN, D. SHAPIRO & H. WECHSLER, HART & WECHSLER'S
FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYsTEM 317-22 (2d ed. 1973) [hereinafter cited as HART
& WECHSLER]. However, if it does create inferior federal courts pursuant to article III, it
may not give them the power to decide matters not encompassed by the limiting "case or
controversy" requirement of that article, U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, nor may it give them
power to decide cases falling outside one of the specific heads of judicial power enumerated
in article III. See generally HART & WECHSLER at 64-214.




eral expenditures.4" The national government has always been the
stronger party in litigation against private citizens, but now its relative
strength is overwhelming. Doctrines that seemed necessary to protect a
comparatively weak national government at the beginning of the 19th
century, or even after the Civil War, now may have to yield to an ap-
proach that reflects greater awareness of the critical values that were at
the heart of the decision by the Founding Fathers that institutional
checks and balances were as essential to the maintenance of a democratic
republic as express constitutional guarantees against governmental en-
croachment on individual liberties. Both the majority and dissenting
opinions in Marathon reflect these fundamental constitutional concerns.
The bankruptcy court system at issue in Marathon had an ambiguous
constitutional status. The Act creating it referred to the bankruptcy
courts as "adjuncts" to the United States district courts.4 5 Yet its judges
were not to be appointed by the federal courts (as had been the bank-
ruptcy referees before them) but by the President, with the advice and
consent of the Senate, for fourteen year terms.46 The new bankruptcy
judges could be removed by a vote of the judicial council of the circuit in
which they sat.47
These "adjunct" judges, however, were given all the powers of a court
of equity, law, and admiralty except the power to enjoin another court or
to punish a criminal contempt not committed in the presence of the judge
or warranting imprisonment. As Justice Brennan pointed out in
Marathon:
In addition to this broad grant of power, Congress has allowed
bankruptcy judges the power to hold jury trials, § 1480; to issue
declaratory judgments, § 2201; to issue writs of habeas corpus
under certain circumstances, § 2256; to issue all writs necessary
in aid of the bankruptcy court's expanded jurisdiction, § 451, see
28 U.S.C. § 1651 (1976 ed.); and to issue any order, process or
In a footnote in Marathon, Justice Brennan commented:
Drawing the line between permissable [sic] extensions of legislative power and
impermissible incursions into judicial power is a delicate undertaking, for the
powers of the Judicial and Legislative Branches are often overlapping. As Justice
Frankfurter noted in a similar context, "To be sure, the content of the three au-
thorities of government is not to be derived from an abstract analysis. The areas
are partly interacting, not wholly disjointed." Youngstown Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S.
579, 610, 72 S.Ct. 863, 897, 96 L.Ed. 1153 (1952) (concurring opinion). The inter-
action between the Legislative and Judicial Branches is at its height where courts
are adjudicating rights wholly of Congress' creation. Thus where Congress creates
a substantive right, pursuant to one of its broad powers to make laws, Congress
may have something to say about the proper manner of adjudicating that right.
__ U.S. at - , 102 S.Ct. at 2878 n.35.
'5 28 U.S.C. § 151(a) (1982).
" Id. §§ 152-153(a).
"v Id. § 153(b).
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judgment that is necessary or appropriate to carry out the provi-
sions of title 11, 11 U.S.C. § 105(A) (1976 ed., Supp. III)."
Judicial review of judgments of the bankruptcy courts was available in
article III courts, including the court of appeals and, in some circum-
stances, the United States district courts.49
The constitutionality of the bankruptcy courts arose in the Marathon
case after Northern Pipeline, which had filed a petition for reorganization
under the Bankruptcy Act, filed a suit in the Bankruptcy Court for the
District of Minnesota against Marathon Pipe Line. The plaintiffs sought
damages for alleged breaches of contract and warranty, misrepresenta-
tion, coercion, and duress. Marathon moved for dismissal of the suit on
the ground that the Act unconstitutionally conferred article III judicial
power upon judges who lacked tenure during good behavior and protec-
tion against salary diminution. The bankruptcy judge denied the motion
to dismiss, but the district court, to which an appeal was made, granted
the motion on the ground that 'the delegation of authority in 28 U.S.C.
§ 1471 to the Bankruptcy Judges to try cases otherwise relegated under
the Constitution to Article III judges' "50 was unconstitutional. Northern
Pipeline and the United States as intervenor appealed the decision to the
Supreme Court.
Although a majority of the Justices of the Supreme Court agreed that
the Bankruptcy Act was unconstitutional and in violation of article III,
there was not a clear majority opinion on the extent of the holding or the
underlying reasoning for it. Justice Brennan delivered the plurality opin-
ion for himself and Justices Marshall, Blackmun and Stevens. Justice
Rehnquist wrote a concurring opinion for himself and Justice O'Connor.
Chief Justice Burger wrote a separate dissenting opinion, and Justice
White wrote a dissenting opinion in which the Chief Justice and Justice
Powell joined.
As the Chief Justice pointed out in his dissent, the only clear holding
for which the decision in Marathon can be said to stand is limited to the
proposition stated by Justice Rehnquist in his concurrence-that a
"traditional" state common law action, not made subject to a federal rule
of decision and related only peripherally to an adjudication of bankruptcy
under federal law, must, absent the consent of the litigants, be heard by
an "Article III court" if it is to be heard by any court or agency of the
United States. 1
The plurality opinion by Justice Brennan goes substantially beyond
this narrow proposition, however, and the concurring opinion of Justice
Rehnquist suggests only that he and Justice O'Connor were reluctant to
8 __ U.S. at -, 102 S.Ct. at 2863.
28 U.S.C. § 1293 (1982).
- U.S. at __, 102 S.Ct. at 2864 (quoting App. to Juris. Statement la).




consider the broad question of congressional power to confer judicial
power to non-article III courts because the only issue before the Court
was a very narrow state contract claim. Justice Rehnquist stated:
I need not decide whether these cases in fact support a general
proposition and three tidy exceptions, as the plurality believes, or
whether instead they are but landmarks on a judicial "darkling
plain" where ignorant armies have clashed by night, as Justice
White apparently believes them to be. None of the cases has gone
so far as to sanction the type of adjudication to which Marathon
will be subjected against its will under the provisions of the 1978
Act. To whatever extent different powers granted under that Act
might be sustained under the "public rights" doctrine of Murray's
Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 18 How. 272 . . .
(1855), and succeeding cases, I am satisfied that the adjudication
of Northern's lawsuit cannot be so sustained.2
While Justice Rehnquist thus espoused a narrower basis for the holding
than that of the plurality, he nonetheless concurred in the broad judg-
ment of unconstitutionality reached by the Justices joining the plurality.
He agreed that "this grant of authority is not readily severable from the
remaining grant of authority to Bankruptcy Courts. .. ."
There is constitutional common ground among the majority and dis-
senting Justices in the Marathon case. All of the justices are agreed that
the Constitution imposes some limits on the power of Congress to confer
judicial power on tribunals that do not comply with the requirements of
article III. The challenge is to attempt to determine what the Justices
might regard as the limits with respect to the Claims Court. A brief re-
view of the plurality opinion written by Justice Brennan and of the dis-
senting opinion written by Justice White may provide some clues, how-
ever inconclusive. These clues will serve to isolate and sharpen the special
issues that will demand consideration in any determination of the consti-
tutionality of the Claims Court legislation.
B. Marathon and the Claims Court: A Standard for Analysis of the
Power of Non-article III Tribunals
At the outset, it is important to note that the determinative issue in
Marathon, as to which there was a majority decision, was the question of
the power of Congress to give a non-article III tribunal jurisdiction to
decide claims arising under state law. The action brought in the bank-
ruptcy court by Northern Pipeline against Marathon Pipe Line was a
common law action in which the rights asserted depended on state law for
their existence. A United States district court would have had jurisdiction
5 Id. at , 102 S.Ct. at 2881-82.
53 Id. at , 102 S.Ct. at 2882.
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to hear such a claim incident to a bankruptcy proceeding under earlier
precedents established by the Supreme Court." This is the case even
though as a general rule federal courts do not have power under the Con-
stitution to take jurisdiction of cases arising under state law unless the
parties to the case are of diverse citizenship, bringing the case within the
diversity power of the Constitution." Exceptions to the diversity require-
ment are made in three instances: 1) for state law claims asserted by way
of counterclaim or third party claim in a case otherwise "arising under"
federal law in the first instance (ancillary jurisdiction); 2) claims raised
by a plaintiff that are in addition but closely related to federal claims
raised in the same complaint (pendent jurisdiction); 56 3) cases brought
under the Federal Interpleader Act. The claim under state law raised in
the Marathon case would not have fallen within any of these exceptions
to the constitutional requirement. The sole question for decision by the
Supreme Court was the constitutional question whether a court not en-
dowed with the protections required by article III could hear a case aris-
ing under state law as one of the incidents of an ongoing bankruptcy
proceeding.
Although claims arising under state law, as well as other issues of state
law, are frequently connected with government contract disputes, they
are not likely to pose a problem for Claims Court litigation, which is lim-
ited to cases brought by contractors against the government. Subcontrac-
tors, who may have state law claims against the contractor, are not per-
mitted to bring those claims in the Claims Court, but must litigate them
elsewhere.5 7
Federal law governs contracts with the United States.5 8 Issues of state
law may arise in the course of a proceeding, however, and state law has
been successfully asserted as a defense to execution on a judgment for the
government in a contracts case which was heard in the United States dis-
trict court." Although occasional issues of state law may arise in the
course of a Claims Court proceeding, the precise issue that provided the
basis for the majority decision in Marathon would not.
Cases asserting a right to "just compensation" for government taking of
private property for public use assert a right to relief arising directly
Williams v. Austrian, 331 U.S. 642 (1947); Schumacher v. Beeler, 293 U.S. 367 (1934).
6 Jurisdiction over such cases is extended to the United States district courts by
28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1982).
5 United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 (1966).
See, e.g., Severin v. United States, 99 Ct.Cl. 435 (1943), cert. denied, 322 U.S. 733
(1944) (subcontractor could not recover damages against the government through the con-
tractor's suit).
" United States v. County of Alleghany, 322 U.S. 174 (1944); Clearfield Trust Co. v.
United States, 318 U.S. 363 (1943). See also United States v. Seckinger, 397 U.S. 203, 209-
10 (1970) (court is guided also by evolved general principles concerning contract
interpretation).




under the Constitution,60 as well as under the Tucker Act,6" on a theory
of implied-in-fact contract. At least since the Supreme Court's decision in
Bivens v. Six Unknown Agents,6" such a case also calls for application of
federal common law principles.
This examination of the opinions in Marathon, therefore, will be solely
for the purpose of determining the standards that guided the Justices in
their analysis of the limitations article III of the Constitution places on
the power of Congress to confer federal judicial power on non-article III
tribunals.
The status of the bankruptcy courts, unlike that of the Claims Court,
was ambiguous. Congress did not declare it to be created under article I,
nor did it state that it was a "legislative" court. Instead, the court was
declared to be an "adjunct" of the district court, but was given full equi-
table and legal powers, including the power to render final judgments in
bankruptcy cases.6 Clearly it was not an administrative agency. However,
since the status was ambiguous, the Supreme Court examined all possible
justifications that might have been advanced, based on historical prece-
dents, for conferring federal judicial power on a non-article III body.
1. The Brennan Plurality
Justice Brennan approached the problem by classifying the precedents
according to the nature of the tribunals that the Supreme Court had ex-
cepted from the requirements of article III in the past. He made clear his
view that the historical exceptions were just that-exceptions to a consti-
tutional requirement that the judicial power of the United States be
vested in courts with judges protected by tenure and salary guarantees.
He stated:
[W]hen properly understood, these precedents represent no broad
departure from the constitutional command that the judicial
power of the United States must be vested in Art. III courts.
Rather they reduce to three narrow situations not subject to that
command, each recognizing a circumstance in which the grant of
power to the Legislative and Executive Branches was historically
and constitutionally so exceptional that the congressional asser-
tion of a power to create legislative courts was consistent with,
rather than threatening to, the constitutional mandate of separa-
tion of powers. These precedents simply acknowledge that the lit-
eral command of Art. III, assigning the judicial power of the
United States to courts insulated from Legislative or Executive
*0 United States v. Great Falls Mfg., 112 U.S. 645 (1884).
61 28 U.S.C. § 507 (1982).
62 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
" 28 U.S.C. § 151(a) (1982).
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interference, must be interpreted in light of the historical context
in which the Constitution was written, and of the structural im-
peratives of the Constitution as a whole.6
The first group of exceptions examined by Justice Brennan consists of
the "territorial" courts cases. The leading case is American Insurance Co.
v. Canter,6 5 where the Court, in an opinion by Justice John Marshall, first
created the exception. Justice Marshall stated that article IV of the Con-
stitution bestowed on Congress alone the complete power of government
over the territories that were not within the states that comprised the
United States. Such courts, he said, were
created in virtue of the general right of sovereignty which exists
in the government, or in virtue of that clause which enables Con-
gress to make all needful rules and regulations, respecting the ter-
ritory belonging to the United States. The jurisdiction with which
they are invested . .. is conferred by Congress, in the execution
of those general powers which that body possesses over the terri-
tories of the United States . ..In legislating for them, Congress
exercises the combined powers of the general, and of a state
government."6
The Court used similar reasoning in reviewing the creation of non-arti-
cle III courts in the District of Columbia.6 7 In Palmore v. United
States,"8 the Court sustained the creation of a system of courts for the
District of Columbia pursuant to the plenary authority of Congress to
provide a government for the District of Columbia granted by article I,
section 8, clause 17 of the Constitution.
Justice Brennan stated that courts-martial provide a similar exception
to the requirements of article III:
[These also involve] a constitutional grant of power that has been
historically understood as giving the political branches of Govern-
ment extraordinary control over the precise subject matter at is-
sue. Art. I, § 8, cls. 13, 14, confer upon Congress the power "to
provide and maintain a Navy," and "to make Rules for the Gov-
ernment and Regulation of the land and naval Forces." 9
The third group of exceptions posed the greatest difficulty. This group
-___ U.S. at __, 102 S.Ct. at 2867-68 (footnote omitted).
' 28 U.S. (1 Pet.) 511 (1828).
66 Id. at 546.
e In Kendall v. United States, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 524 (1838), the Court stated that "Con-
gress has the entire control over the District for every purpose of government; and it is
reasonable to suppose, that in organizing a judicial department here, all judicial power nec-
essary for the purposes of government would be vested in the courts of justice." Id. at 619.
68 411 U.S. 389 (1973).




includes all of the cases not in the first two groups that have justified
non-article III status for tribunals adjudicating so-called "public rights."
All federal administrative agencies and similar tribunals are included in
this group. The case that gave rise to this exception, Murray v. Hoboken
Land & Improvement Co.,7 0 contained the following statement:
We do not consider congress can either withdraw from judicial
cognizance any matter which, from its nature, is the subject of a
suit at the common law, or in equity, or admiralty; nor, on the
other hand, can it bring under the judicial power a matter which,
from its nature, is not subject for judicial determination. At the
same time, there are matters, involving public rights, which may
be presented in such form that the judicial power is capable of
acting on them, and which are susceptible of judicial determina-
tion, but which congress may or may not bring within the cogni-
zance of the courts of the United States, as it may deem proper.
7 1
As Justice Brennan analyzes the precedents (some of them cases con-
cerning the former Court of Claims), the "public rights" cases involve
"matters that could be conclusively determined by the Executive and
Legislative Branches" as distinguished from matters that are "inherently
judicial." He states that the doctrine may be partly explained by "refer-
ence to the traditional principle of sovereign immunity, which recognizes
that the Government may attach conditions to its consent to be sued.
'7 2
But, he adds,
the public-rights doctrine also draws upon the principle of sepa-
ration of powers, and an historical understanding that certain
prerogatives were reserved to the political branches of govern-
ment. The doctrine extends only to matters arising "between the
Government and persons subject to its authority in connection
with the performance of the constitutional functions of the execu-
tive or legislative departments," Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22,
50, 52 S.Ct. 285, 292, 76 L.Ed. 98 (1932), and only to matters that
historically could have been determined exclusively by those de-
partments, see Ex parte Bakelite Corp., [279 U.S. 438, 458
(1928)]. The understanding of these cases is that the Framers ex-
pected that Congress would be free to commit such matters com-
pletely to non-judicial executive determination, and that as a re-
sult there can be no constitutional objection to Congress'
employing the less drastic expedient of committing their determi-
nation to a legislative court or an administrative agency.7 '3
70 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272 (1855).
" Id. at 284.
7 __ U.S. at __, 102 S.Ct. at 2869.
73 Id.
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Justice Brennan concluded that while the "public rights" doctrine had
not been "conclusively explained" in the Court's precedents, it was not
necessary to undertake that task in the Marathon litigation because:
[A] matter of public rights must at a minimum arise "between
the government and others" [citing the Bakelite case]. In con-
trast, "the liability of one individual to another under the law as
defined,". . . is a matter of private rights. Our precedents clearly
establish that only controversies in the former category may be
removed from Art. III courts and delegated to legislative courts
or administrative agencies for their determination. [Citations
omitted.] Private-rights disputes, on the other hand, lie at the
core of the historically recognized judicial power. 4
Since the claim objected to the Marathon case was a private dispute
arising under state law, it clearly did not fall within the public rights doc-
trine in Brennan's view, making it unnecessary for him to analyze that
doctrine more fully and critically. He did conclude, however, that even in
the broad area theoretically encompassed within the "public rights" ex-
ception, "the presumption is in favor of Art. III courts." 5 He also stated
that "when Congress assigns these matters to administrative agencies, or
to legislative courts, it has generally provided, and we have suggested that
it may be required to provide, for Art. III judicial review. ' 1"
Unlike the concurring Justices, the plurality Justices did not conclude
their analysis of Marathon with the decision that the existence of a state
common law claim took the case out of an ill-defined "public rights" ex-
ception to article III requirements. Justice Brennan went on to consider
two further, but related, arguments: first, that Congress' constitutional
power to create uniform national bankruptcy laws"7 carried with it the
power to create legislative courts to adjudicate bankruptcy-related con-
troversies; and second, that since the bankruptcy courts created by the
Act were designated as merely "adjuncts," the jurisdiction over bank-
ruptcy matters was really conferred on the United States district courts.
In response to the first argument, Justice Brennan responded by saying
that such an ancillary power argument contains no limiting principle and
thus "threatens to supplant completely our system of adjudication in in-
dependent Art. III tribunals and replace it with a system of 'specialized'
legislative courts. 71 8
The appellants had relied on Palmore v. United States79 to support
7, Id. at 
__, 102 S.Ct. at 2870.
71 Id. at ,102 S.Ct. at 2870-71 n.23.
76 Id. (citing Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety Comm'n, 430 U.S. 442, 455 n.13
(1977)).
77 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
78 - U.S. at -, 102 S.Ct. at 2872.




their argument. In Palmore the Court had held that the Constitution con-
ferred on Congress plenary authority over the government of the District
of Columbia and that this gave it the power to create a system of courts
for the District outside the limitations of article III. In Palmore the
Court had stated:
Both Congress and this Court have recognized that . .. the re-
quirements of Art. III, which are applicable where laws of na-
tional applicability and affairs of national concern are at stake,
must in proper circumstances give way to accomodate plenary
grants of power to Congress to legislate with respect to specialized
areas having particularized needs and warranting distinctive
treatment."
Justice Brennan reasoned that the argument based on this language in
Palmore was "in essence, . . . that pursuant to any of its Art. I powers,
Congress may create courts free of Art. III's requirements whenever it
finds that course expedient. This contention has been rejected in previous
cases." 8' He stated:
In short, to accept appellants' reasoning, would require that we
replace the principles delineated in our precedents, rooted in his-
tory and the Constitution, with a rule of broad legislative discre-
tion that could effectively eviscerate the constitutional guarantee
of an independent Judicial Branch of the Federal Government.2
Further, Justice Brennan distinguished Palmore from Marathon On the
ground that the plenary authority expressly granted to Congress over the
District included all powers of government including the judicial power,
and that it was limited to a defined geographical area.
The second argument, that the bankruptcy courts were merely "ad-
juncts" of the United States District Courts and that therefore the Act
was consistent with the requirements of article III, rested on the Court's
reasoning in United States v. Raddatz8 3 and Crowell v. Benson . 4 The
Court held that the use of magistrates in Raddatz or administrative agen-
cies in Crowell as factfinding adjuncts to the district courts did not vio-
late article III as long as "the essential attributes of judicial power"85 re-
mained in an article III tribunal. Justice Brennan appended a further
limiting requirement in a footnote, stating that such practices were not
unconstitutional "so long as Congress' adjustment of the traditional man-
:o Id. at 407-08.
,I - U.S. at , 102 S.Ct. at 2872 (citing Atlas Roofing Co., 430 U.S. at 450 n.7);
Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11 (1955).
2 _ U.S. at -, 102 S.Ct. at 2873.
- 447 U.S. 667 (1980).
04 285 U.S. 22 (1932).
" Id. at 51.
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ner of adjudication can be sufficiently linked to its legislative power to
define substantive rights.18 6
Justice Brennan pointed out that in Crowell, the administrative agency
empowered to determine "questions of fact as to the circumstances, na-
ture, extent and consequences of the injuries sustained by the employee
for which compensation is to be made" did not have the power to enforce
any of its compensation orders. "On the contrary, every compensation or-
der was appealable to the appropriate federal district court, which had
the sole power to enforce it or set it aside, depending upon whether the
court determined it to be in accordance with law and supported by evi-
dence in the record. '8 7
In Raddatz, the Court upheld the constitutionality of the 1978 Federal
Magistrates Act which permitted the referral to magistrates by district
court judges of certain pretrial motions, including motions to suppress
evidence based on alleged violation of constitutional rights. In Raddatz
the Court found that determinations made by the magistrates were sub-
ject to de novo review by the district court judge, who was free to rehear
the evidence or call for additional evidence. Moreover, the magistrates
were empowered to hear motions only on referal by the district courts,
and they were appointed and subject to removal by the district courts.
"In short, the ultimate decisionmaking authority respecting all pretrial
motions clearly remained with the district court."88
Justice Brennan summed up his analysis of these cases with the follow-
ing comment:
Together these cases establish two principles that aid us in de-
termining the extent to which Congress may constitutionally vest
traditionally judicial functions in non-Art. III officers. First, it is
clear that when Congress creates a substantive federal right, it
possesses substantial discretion to prescribe the manner in which
that right may be adjudicated-including the assignment to an
adjunct of some functions historically performed by judges ...
Second, the functions of the adjunct must be limited in such a
____ U.S. at __., 102 S. Ct. at 2874 n.29.
Id. at __, 102 S. Ct. at 2875.
8 Id. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit very recently held that a
section of the Magistrates Act of 1979 not at issue in Raddatz is unconstitutional. Pace-
maker Diagnostic Clinic of Am., Inc. v. Instromedix, Inc., Nos. 82-3152, 82-3182 (9th Cir.
Aug. 5, 1983) (available Aug. 25, 1983, on LEXIS, Genfed library, Cir file). In this case the
parties to a patent infringement suit had consented to have the case tried by a magistrate,
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) (Supp. V 1981), which empowers the magistrate in a case
tried by consent to enter a final judgment subject to review only on appeal. Unlike the
provision at issue at Raddatz, the decision of the magistrate under § 636(c) was not subject
to de novo review by the district court judge. The Ninth Circuit found this section inconsis-
tent with the requirements of article III of the Constitution, relying in large part on the




way that "the essential attributes" of judicial power are retained
in Art. III court. 9
In an important footnote addendum to the foregoing statement, Justice
Brennan added:
Contrary to Justice White's suggestion, we do not concede that
"Congress may provide for intitial adjudications by Article I
courts or administrative judges of all rights and duties arising
under otherwise valid federal laws." . . . Rather we simply reaf-
firm the holding of Crowell-that Congress may assign to non-
Art. III bodies some adjudicatory functions. Crowell itself spoke
of "specialized" functions. This case does not require us to specify
further any limitations that may exist with respect to Congress'
power to create adjuncts to assist in the adjudication of federal
statutory rights.9 0
In addition, Justice Brennan reasoned, congressional power to create
adjuncts to assist in the determination of federal statutory rights does not
support the proposition that such power extends to the use of adjuncts to
determine federal constitutional rights. He stated that such an assump-
tion was rejected in Crowell v. Benson9' and that it was implicitly re-
jected in United States v. Raddatz.92
Congress' assignment of adjunct functions under the Federal
Magistrates Act was substantially narrower than under the stat-
ute challenged in Crowell. Yet the Court's scrutiny of the adjunct
scheme in Raddatz-which played a role in the adjudication of
constitutional rights-was far stricter than it had been in Crow-
ell. Critical to the Court's decision to uphold the Magistrates Act
was the fact that the ultimate decision was made by the district
court."'
He added:
Moreover, such a distinction seems to us to be necessary in
light of the delicate accommodations required by the principle of
separation of powers reflected in Art. III. The constitutional sys-
tem of checks and balances is designed to guard against "en-
croachment or aggrandizement" by Congress at the expense of
the other branches of government. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S., at
122. But when Congress creates a statutory right, it clearly has
8 Id. at -' 102 S.Ct. at 2876.
90 Id. at 102 S.Ct. at 2876 n.32.
" 285 U.S. 22, 60-61 (1931).
" 447 U.S. 667, 683 (1980).
' __ U.S. at -, 102 S.Ct. at 2877. See also United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667
(1980).
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the discretion in defining that right, to create presumptions, or
assign burdens of proof, or prescribe remedies; it may also pro-
vide that persons seeking to vindicate that right must do so
before particularized tribunals created to perform the specialized
adjudicative tasks related to that right. Such provisions do, in a
sense, affect the exercise of judicial power, but they are also inci-
dental to Congress' power to define the right that it has created.
No comparable justification exists, however, when the right being
adjudicated is not of congressional creation. In such a situation,
substantial inroads into functions that have traditionally been
performed by the judiciary cannot be characterized merely as in-
cidental extensions of Congress' power to define rights that it has
created. Rather, such inroads suggest unwarranted encroach-
ments upon the judicial power of the United States, which our
Constitution reserves for Art. III courts.
We hold that the Bankruptcy Act of 1978 carries the possibility
of such an unwarranted encroachment. Many of the rights subject
to adjudication by the Act's bankruptcy courts, like the rights im-
plicated in Raddatz, are not of Congress' creation. 4
The plurality Justices also found fault with the extensive power con-
ferred on the bankruptcy judges by the Act:
Unlike the administrative scheme that we reviewed in Crowell,
the Act vests all "essential attributes" of the judicial power of the
United States in the "adjunct" bankruptcy court. First, the
agency in Crowell made only specialized, narrowly confined fac-
tual determinations regarding a particularized area of law. In con-
trast, the subject matter jurisdiction of the bankruptcy courts en-
compasses not only traditional matters of bankruptcy, but also
"all civil proceedings arising under title 11 or arising in or related
to cases arising under title 11." 28 U.S.C. sec. 1471(b) (1976 ed.,
Supp III) (emphasis added). Second, while the agency in Crowell
engaged in statutorily channeled factfinding functions, the bank-
ruptcy courts exercise "all of the jurisdiction" conferred by the
Act on the district courts, sec. 1471(b) (emphasis added). Third,
the agency in Crowell possessed only a limited power to issue
compensation orders pursuant to specialized procedures, and its
orders could be enforced only by order of the district court. By
contrast, the bankruptcy courts exercise all ordinary powers of
district courts, including the power to preside over jury trials,
28 U.S.C. sec. 1480 (1976 ed., Supp. III), the power to issue de-
claratory judgments, sec. 2201, the power to issue writs of habeas
corpus, sec. 2256, and the power to issue any order, process or




judgment appropriate for the enforcement of the provisions of ti-
tle 11, 11 U.S.C. sec. 105(a) (1976 ed. Supp. III). Fourth, while
orders issued by the agency in Crowell were to be set aside if "not
supported by the evidence," the judgments of the bankruptcy
courts are apparently subject to review only under the more def-
erential "clearly erroneous" standard. Finally, the agency in
Crowell was required by law to seek enforcement of its compensa-
tion orders in district court. In contrast, the bankruptcy courts
issue final judgments, which are binding and enforceable even in
the absence of an appeal. In short, the "adjunct" bankruptcy
courts created by the Act exercise jurisdiction behind the facade
of a grant to the district courts, and are exercising powers far
greater than those lodged in the adjuncts approved in either
Crowell or Raddatz.
We conclude that sec. 241(a) of the Bankruptcy Act of 1978
has impermissibly removed most, if not all, of "the essential at-
tributes of the judicial power" from the Art. III district court,
and has vested those attributes in a non-Art. III adjunct. Such a
grant of jurisdiction cannot be sustained as an exercise of Con-
gress' power to create adjuncts to Art. III courts. 5
2. The Marathon Dissent: Rejecting the "Public Rights" Doctrine
Justice White, convinced that history has made it impossible to adhere
to the meaning obviously attached by the draftsmen of the Constitution
to article III, was critical of the plurality opinion because he believed
that "[iln its attempt to pigeonhole [the historical precedents] the plural-
ity does violence to their meaning and creates an artificial structure that
itself lacks coherence.
96
Justice White's main argument is that "any . . . attempt to distinguish
Article I from Article III courts by the character of the controversies
they may adjudicate fundamentally misunderstands the historical and
constitutional significance of Article I courts."9 He attempts, through a
painstaking analysis of Justice Brennan's opinion and the precedents
upon which it relies, to show that there is no way to logically limit the
power of Congress to create non-article III tribunals to determine cases
that are within the judicial power defined by article III. He suggests that
in the final analysis the only limiting factor is a matter of principle that
finds expression in a balancing of constitutional powers:
To say that the Court has failed to articulate a principle by
which we can test the constitutionality of a putative Article I
Id. at , 102 S.Ct. at 2878-80.
Id. at .102 S.Ct. at 2883.
17 Id. at ,102 S.Ct. at 2885.
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court, or that there is no such abstract principle, is not to say that
this Court must always defer to the legislative decision to create
Article I, rather than Article III, courts. Article III is not to be
read out of the Constitution; rather, it should be read as expres-
sing one value that must be balanced against competing constitu-
tional values and legislative responsibilities. This Court retains
the final word on how the balance is to be struck. 8
Justice White contends that a balancing test such as the one proposed
has actually been behind many decisions of the Court, including Palmore
v. United States (District of Columbia courts)"9 and Glidden v. Zdanok
(Court of Claims and Court of Custom and Patent Appeals). °00 He also
contends that the holding in Palmore was not limited to geographically
defined specialized courts, as Justice Brennan claimed. (The majority
opinion in Palmore was written by Justice White.)
Justice White explained his proposed balancing test as follows:
I do not suggest that the Court should simply look to the
strength of the legislative interest and ask itself if that interest is
more compelling than the values furthered by Article III. The in-
quiry should, rather, focus equally on those Article III values and
ask whether and to what extent the legislative scheme accommo-
dates them or, conversely, substantially undermines them. The
burden on Article III values should then be measured against the
values Congress hopes to serve through the use of Article I
courts. 0 '
He suggests that appellate review of the decisions of legislative courts
would help to insure separation of powers (at the national level), and
that, like appellate review of state court decisions, would provide a "firm
check on the ability of the political institutions of government to ignore
or transgress constitutional limits on their own authority."'0 2 He con-
cludes that a system of legislative courts that provided for judicial review
by article III courts would "be substantially less controversial than a leg-
islative attempt entirely to avoid judicial review in a constitutional
court." 0 3
Justice White's final point on the balancing approach goes to the heart
of the constitutional system of checks and balances:
Similarly, as long as the proposed Article I courts are designed
to deal with issues likely to be of little interest to the political
:8 Id. at _ , 102 S.Ct. at 2893.
9 411 U.S. 389 (1973).
100 370 U.S. 530 (1962).






branches, there is less reason to fear that such courts represent a
dangerous accumulation of power in one of the political branches
of government. Chief Justice Vinson suggested as much when he
stated that the Court should guard against any congressional at-
tempt "to transfer jurisdiction for the purpose of emasculating"
constitutional courts.
1 0 4
Justice White concluded that the bankruptcy courts created by the
1978 Bankruptcy Act satisfied the balancing standard and the specific
tests he had proposed.'0 5 First, the Act provided for appellate review of
bankruptcy court decisions by article III courts. Second, the Bankruptcy
Act was not "an attempt by the political branches of government to ag-
grandize themselves at the expense of the third branch or an attempt to
undermine the authority of constitutional courts in general."' ' There was
support in the legislative history for the view that Congress was prompted
to create the new courts at least in part because it thought that article III
courts lacked interest in bankruptcy matters and would fail to deal with
them in an expeditious manner. In addition, there was little chance that
Congress would bring political pressure to bear on bankruptcy court
judges, since bankruptcy proceedings are usually "private adjudications
of little political significance.' 0 7 Third the purposes Congress sought to
accomplish by creating non-article III bankruptcy courts were
"compelling."
The real question is not whether Congress was justified in es-
tablishing a specialized bankruptcy court, but rather whether it
was justified in failing to create a specialized, Article III bank-
ruptcy court. . . .Congress may legitimately consider the effect
on the federal judiciary of the addition of several hundred spe-
cialized judges. . . .The addition of several hundred specialists
may substantially change, whether for good or bad, the character
of the federal bench. 0 8
The need for bankruptcy judges could change; if the appointments
were made pursuant to article III, there could be a surplus of highly spe-
cialized judges. Finally, "Congress may have believed" that the change
from a system of bankruptcy referees to that of article I judges was "less
disruptive of the existing bankruptcy and constitutional court systems,
than would be a change to article III judges."' 0 9
The approaches of the plurality and dissenting Justices to the analysis
'" Id. (quoting National Mut. Ins. Co. v. Tidewater Co., 337 U.S. 582, 644 (1948)).
05 __ U.S. at , 102 S.Ct. at 2894.
'" Id at -, 102 S.Ct. at 2895.
107 Id.
108 Id.
"' Id. at 102 S.Ct. at 2896.
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of the constitutional problem posed by the Bankruptcy Act are quite dis-
similar. On the one hand, the plurality opinion stresses that there is a
strong presumption in favor of article III courts deciding cases falling
within the scope of the "judicial power" defined by article III of the Con-
stitution, even when those are so-called "public rights" cases arising
under federal law. Only those exceptions falling within two relatively
well-defined classes of precedents and one more nebulous group of prece-
dents (which is hedged about with various procedural limitations) will be
permitted under the plurality analysis. The dissenting Justices, on the
other hand, consider the precedents to be of little value to analysis except
as they reveal a departure from the literal requirements of article III and
the substitution of a policy-oriented balancing approach. Such an ap-
proach weighs separation-of-power values expressed by article III against
the values and needs that may underlie a particular decision by Congress
to create a specialized tribunal that does not conform to the tenure and
salary provisions of article III.
All of the Justices evince a concern for the proper maintenance of the
constitutional separation of powers between the legislative, executive and
judicial branches; their differences in this area are more of degree than of
quality. All of the Justices would also agree that the constitutional
scheme will tolerate some deviations from the express requirements of
article III, but that there are limits on the kind and extent of deviation
that will be considered permissible. At the extreme edges of possibility,
one could expect all of the Justices to agree that congressional creation of
non-article III tribunals either violated or did not violate article III of
the Constitution. Short of the extremes of possibility, however, it is diffi-
cult, if not impossible, to predict the result that might follow from appli-
cation of either the plurality or dissenting approaches to a different legis-
lative scheme.11 0
C. The Pre-Marathon Litigation
Significantly, none of the Justices in the Marathon case endorsed rea-
soning espoused in earlier Supreme Court cases which had held that the
United States Court of Claims was an article I court. That, together with
the fact that the Supreme Court in 1962"' had expressly repudiated the
reasoning of those earlier cases and had held that the Court of Claims
was, indeed, an article III court, means at the very least that the consti-
tutionality of the Claims Court legislation is open to serious question.
110 Recent commentary has suggested two alternative methods for allocating power be-
tween article III and non-article III bodies, urging that the method suggested by the Jus-
tices in Marathon would have adverse consequences for federal administrative agencies. See
Redish, Legislative Courts, Administrative Agencies, and the Northern Pipeline Decision,
1983 DUKE L.J. 197-229.




An examination of two earlier decisions, Williams v. United States 2
and Ex parte Bakelite Corp.,"3 in light of the changed analytical ap-
proaches taken by the present Supreme Court Justices, will help to illus-
trate why they are of doubtful precedential value today in resolving this
constitutional question. The analysis must be prefaced, however, by a re-
view of the history of the Court of Claims." 4
Prior to the creation of the Court of Claims in 1855, claims against the
government of the United States were dealt with solely by means of pri-
vate legislation in Congress. The need for congressional participation in
the payment of such claims is grounded in the Constitution: article I, sec-
tion 9, clause 17 provides that: "[n]o Money shall be drawn from the
Treasury, but in Consequence of Appropriations made by Law;" further,
the appropriation process is distinct from the process of enacting sub-
stantive legislation (although substantive "riders" are frequently attached
appropriations legislation)."' The enactment of substantive legislation
must be made pursuant to the provisions of article I, section 7,
clause 2,11 which is the familiar process of passage by both the Senate
and the House of Representatives, and either approval by the President
or the necessary votes in Congress to override his veto.
When it was first established, the role of the Court of Claims was
largely to advise the Congress in this private legislative process, that is, to
help the Congress determine what claims should be paid and how much
compensation was due. In carrying out this function, the Court of Claims
held trials and took evidence, but its decisions lacked the force of deci-
sions made by a court of law because they were subject to revision by
Congress."' It was for this reason that the Supreme Court, in Gordon v.
12 289 U.S. 553 (1933).
13 279 U.S. 438 (1929).
'" See Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530 (1962); W. COWEN, P. NICHOLS, JR. &
M. BENNETT, THE UNITED STATES COURT OF CLAIMS, A HISTORY, PART II, ORI-
GIN-DEVELOPMENT-JURISDICTION 1855-1978 (reprinted in 216 Ct. Cl. 1); Miller, The New
United States Claims Court, 32 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 7 (1983).
"' The Supreme Court has ruled that Congress has the power not only to authorize ex-
penditures of public moneys to effectuate the legislative powers it possesses, but also may
appropriate funds for the benefit of the general welfare of the people. See United States v.
Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 65 (1936); 3 WORKS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 372 (Lodge ed. 1885).
i1s
Every Bill which shall have passed the House of Representatives and the Senate
shall, before it become a Law, be presented to the President of the United States;
If he approves he shall sign it, but if not he shall return it, with his Objections to
that House in which it shall have originated . . . . If after such Reconsideration
two thirds of that House shall agree to pass the Bill, it shall be sent . . . to the
other House . . . and if approved by two thirds . . . it shall become a Law.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2.
" "Judgements within the powers vested in the Judiciary Article of the Constitution
may not lawfully be revised, overturned or refused faith and credit by another Department
of the Government." Chicago & S. Air Lines v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 113
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United States,"' held that the decisions of the Court of Claims were not
reviewable in the Supreme Court. They were not "cases or controversies"
within the meaning of article III of the Constitution.
As a result of the decision in Gordon, Congress amended the practice of
the Court of Claims and conferred on that court the power to issue final
judgments which would be paid for out of funds appropriated generally
for the purpose of paying judgments against the United States. If the
judgments exceeded a certain dollar amount, they were referred to Con-
gress and were subject to congressional scrutiny before being approved
for special appropriations legislation."' As a result of these legislative
changes, money judgments of the Court of Claims for the most part were
no longer subject to revision by Congress. This aspect of the law has not
been changed by the enactment of the new Claims Court, 2 ° so that even
though the constitutional status of the court has been changed, its power
to render binding judgments against the United States has not been
altered.
In United States v. Jones,12' decided in 1886 after Congress had given
the Court of Claims the power to render final judgments, the Supreme
Court held that those judgments would be reviewable in the Supreme
Court. Throughout this early period, there had never been a definitive
statement from the Court or from Congress as to whether the Court of
Claims was an article III or an article I court, although the presumption
that appeared to prevail after the decision in United States v. Jones was
that it was an article III court.
In Williams v. United States,'22 a judge of the Court of Claims brought
suit in that court complaining that the Comptroller General of the United
States had made a reduction in his salary in violation of article III. The
government defended on the ground that the Court of Claims was not' an
article III court. Questions concerning the status of the judges were certi-
(1948).
8 69 U.S. (2 Wall.) 561 (1864). Chief Justice Taney stated that if Congress were given
the power to revise the decision of a court, "[tlhe real and ultimate judicial power will,
therefore, be exercised by the Legislative Department, and not by that Department to which
the Constitution has confided it." 117 U.S. app. 697, 703 (1885). (Chief Justice Taney wrote
this opinion just before his death, and according to the other justices it was used as the
basis for the Court's decision in Gordon. The opinion was lost for a time, however, and when
it was later discovered, the Court authorized its separate publication as an appendix to vol-
ume 117. It has since been cited often. See, United States v. Jones, 119 U.S. 477, 478
(1886)).
"9 The power to pay debts was granted to Congress in the Constitution. "The Congress
shall have the Power To . . . pay the Debts and provide for the ... general Welfare of the
United States." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. This clause has been interpreted to give Con-
gress the power to create a judicial forum for claims against the United States. See Pope v.
United States, 323 U.S. 1 (1944); United States v. Realty Co., 163 U.S. 427 (1896).
120 31 U.S.C. § 724(a) (Supp. V 1981).
.2 119 U.S. 477 (1886).




fied to the Supreme Court, which held that the Court of Claims was not
an article III court and that the judges were not entitled to tenure and
salary protections. In reaching its decision, the Court was obviously im-
pressed with the importance of the business of the Court of Claims,'23
and the dangers of having cases against the United States decided by
judges who were dependent "upon the legislative pleasure for the tenure
of their offices and for a continuance of adequate compensation during
their service in office. 1 24 But, the Court concluded, these considerations
of the need for independent judges "though obvious enough" were not
alone sufficient to warrant a conclusion that the court was within the
reach of article III. "The integrity of such a conclusion must rest not
upon its desirability, but upon its conformity with the provisions of the
Constitution.
125
After reviewing the history of the Court of Claims, the Williams Court
concluded that while it originally started out as "nothing more than an
administrative or advisory body," it had been converted into a true court
"and given jurisdiction over controversies which were susceptible of judi-
cial cognizance.' 1 26 However, "the question still remains-and is the vital
question- whether it is the judicial power defined by Art. III of the
Constitution."'
27
The Court then referred to Chief Justice Marshall's opinion in Ameri-
can Insurance Co. v. Canter, 28 dealing with territorial courts, for the pro-
position that while territorial courts (and, of course, other legislative
courts) are invested with judicial power, it "is not a part of that judicial
power which is defined in the 3d article of the Constitution, but is con-
ferred by Congress, in the execution of those general powers which that
body possesses over the territories of the United States."'2 9 The Court
was supportive of the view that legislative courts exercise judicial power.
The fact that the appellate jurisdiction of this court over judg-
ments and decrees of the legislative courts has been upheld and
freely exercised under acts of Congress from a very early period,
[is] a practice which can be sustained, . . . only upon the theory
that the legislative courts possess and exercise judicial power-as
distinguished from legislative, executive, or administrative
power- although not conferred in virtue of the third article of
the Constitution.13 0
"' Id. at 561.
12 Id. at 562.
120 Id.
,2' Id. at 565.
127 Id.
128 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 511 (1828).
,2 Id. at 546.
130 289 U.S. at 566.
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The idea that there is more than one source of the "judicial power" of
the United States in the Constitution has been disclaimed by the Court
in more recent decisions and it seems unlikely that the Court today would
revert to this line of reasoning to sustain the validity of the United States
Claims Court as a non-article III court. This illustrates, however, the con-
ceptual difficulties the Supreme Court has been forced to contend with
over the years in order to justify congressional departures from the tenure
and salary requirements of article III of the Constitution. The difficulty
is most poignantly emphasized by the question posed in the Court's opin-
ion in Williams: "If the power exercised by legislative courts is not judi-
cial power, what is it? Certainly it is not legislative, or executive, or ad-
ministrative power, or any imaginable combination thereof."'' 1
In answering this question, the Court decided to adopt the view it had
expressed five years earlier in dictum, in Ex parte Bakelite Corp.,' 32 that
the Court of Claims, like the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, was a
legislative court and not an article III court. In Bakelite the Court had
said of the Court of Claims:
It was created, and has been maintained as a special tribunal to
examine and determine claims for money against the United
States. This is a function which belongs primarily to Congress as
an incident of its power to pay the debts of the United States.
But the function is one which Congress has a discretion either to
exercise directly or to delegate to other agencies. 133
The Court in Bakelite had added that none of the matters determined by
the Court of Claims necessarily required judicial determination, but were
"susceptible of legislative or executive determination and can have no
other save under and in conformity with permissible legislation 'by
Congress."' 3 4
The Court in Williams did not rely exclusively on the dictum of Bake-
lite for its holding. It proceded to consider a further argument: "namely,
that when the United States consents to be sued, the judicial power of
Art. III at once attaches to the court upon which jurisdiction is conferred
in virtue of the clause which in comprehensive terms extends the judicial
power to 'controversies to which the United States shall be a party.' "5
The Court here referred to the express language in article III extending
the judicial power of the United States to such controversies, which
would appear to encompass all suits brought against the United States as
well as those in which the United States was plaintiff. The Court con-
cluded, after analyzing the language, that the omission of the word "all"
"3 Id. at 567.
132 279 U.S. 438 (1929).
"' Id. at 452.
Id. at 453.




in the passage meant that the judicial power of article III did not extend
to those suits in which the United States was a party defendant, but only
to those in which it was plaintiff.' 6
The Court bolstered this reading of article III by a reference to the
opinion of Chief Justice John Marshall in Cohen v. Virginia,'37 in which
he had said: "The universally received opinion is, that no suit can be
commenced or prosecuted against the United States; that the judiciary
act does not authorize such suits."' 3 8 The fact that Justice Marshall was
here referring to the Judiciary Act of 1789 and not to article III of the
Constitution did not appear to trouble the Williams Court, which had
earlier commented: "The Judiciary Act of 1789 has always been regarded
as practically contemporaneous with the Constitution, and as such, of
great value in expounding the meaning of the judicial article of that
instrument."' 3 9
The Williams analysis failed to consider that the 1789 Judiciary Act
conferred only a small part of the potential judicial power of article III
on the inferior federal coi,ts. Among the notable omissions was general
federal question jurisd'*.tion, for example, which was not created until
1875.4' Moreover. ds Justice Marshall's famous opinion in Osborn v.
Bank of the Ur tted States' revealed, the Chief Justice was not inclined
to construp che judicial power conferred by article III any more narrowly
than ,Pocessary. In any event, the matter before the Court in Cohen v.
Virginia was an appeal from a state court judgment, and the comment
about immunity was dictum, as well as limited to the Judiciary Act.
The Court in Williams attempted to strengthen its argument on the
immunity issue by referring to the immunity of the states from suit in
federal court under the eleventh amendment to the Constitution and to
the Court's decision in Hans v. Louisiana, ' 4 which held that a state could
not be sued by its own citizens in the federal courts. The Court concluded
that the reasoning of that case "applies with equal force to suits against a
state and those brought against the United States."'' 43 The Court thus
rejected the possibility that article III judicial power extends to suits
against as well as by the United States, saying:
It cannot be reconciled with the settled principle that where a
controversy is of such a character as to require the exercise of the
judicial power defined by Art. III, jurisdiction thereof can be
,3 Id. at 573.
,-1 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821).
,SO 289 U.S. at 574.
'3 Id. at 573-74.
140 Act of March 3, 1875, ch. 137, 18 Stat. 470 (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 1331
(1982)).
22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824).
134 U.S. 1 (1889).
143 289 U.S. at 577.
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conferred only on courts established in virtue of that article, and
that Congress is without power to vest that judicial power in any
other judicial tribunal, or, of course, in an executive officer, or
administrative or executive board, since, to repeat the language of
Chief Justice Marshall in American Insurance Co. v. Canter, .
"they are incapable of receiving it.' '144
This idea, including the specific statement of it in Canter, has been
rejected by the Court since the decision in Williams.'4 Indeed, the Wil-
liams decision itself did not appear to rely upon it too heavily, for it pro-
ceeded to another analytical approach, which rested on the famous "pub-
lic rights" doctrine of Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement
Co.,' 41 in which the Court stated that it was beyond the power of Con-
gress to
withdraw from judicial cognizance any matter which, from its na-
ture, is the subject of a suit at common law, or in equity, or admi-
ralty; nor, on the other hand, can it bring under the judicial
power a matter which, from its nature, is not a subject for judicial
determination. At the same time there are matters, involving
public rights, which may be presented in such form that the judi-
cial power is capable of acting on them, and which are susceptible
of judicial determination, but which congress may or may not
bring within the cognizance of the courts of the United States, as
it may deem proper.141
The Court in Williams was thus able to conclude:
Since all matters made cognizable by the Court of Claims are
equally susceptible of legislative or executive determination, ...
they are, of course, matters in respect of which there is no consti-
tutional right to a judicial remedy, . . . and the authority to in-
quiry into and decide them may constitutionally be conferred on
a nonjudicial officer or body. 14 8
As if it was still not satisfied with the analysis, the Williams Court
presented the further argument that finding judicial power in article III
for suits against the United States must be rejected because:
it cannot be reconciled with the limitation fundamentally implicit
.. Id. at 578.
" In a footnote to Marathon, Justice Brennan stated that this dichotomy has not with-
stood analysis since the decision in Williams. "Our more recent cases clearly recognize that
legislative courts may be granted jurisdiction over some cases and controversies to which the
Art. III judicial power might also be extended." - U.S. at - , 102 S.Ct. at 2867 n.14.
146 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272 (1855).
"I Id. at 284.




in the constitutional separation of powers, namely, that a power
definitely assigned by the Constitution to one department can
neither be surrendered nor delegated by that department, nor
vested by statute in another department or agency. . . . And
since Congress, whenever it thinks proper, undoubtedly may,
without infringing the Constitution, confer upon an executive of-
ficer or administrative board, or an existing or specially consti-
tuted court, or retain for itself, the power to hear and determine
controversies respecting claims against the United States, it fol-
lows indubitably that such power, in whatever guise or by
whatever agency exercised, is no part of the judicial power vested
in the constitutional courts by the third article. That is to say, a
power which may be devolved, at the will of Congress, upon any
of the three departments plainly is not within the doctrine of the
separation and independent exercise of governmental powers con-
templated by the tripartite distribution of such powers. " 9
Much of the foregoing argument was implicitly and/or explicitly re-
jected by the Court in its later decision in Glidden Co. v. Zdanok' 50 in
which it held that the Court of Claims was an article III court. Since
article III courts cannot take jurisdiction of cases or controversies that do
not fall within the scope of the judicial power defined by article III,''
the Court necessarily concluded that suits against the United States are
within the judicial power as defined by article III.15'
However, there are two aspects of the Williams decision that should be
pursued in any new consideration of the scope of Congress' power to con-
fer the judicial power of the United States on non-article III courts. The
first, and perhaps most difficult, is the problem of sovereign governmen-
tal immunity from suit and whether the existence of such immunity con-
fers extraordinary powers on Congress to allocate their disposition to
non-article III courts. The second is the question whether, as the Court
suggested in Williams, the Constitution consigns suits against the govern-
ment to the exclusive province and plenary authority of Congress.
Although federal government immunity from suit is not a doctrine ex-
pressed in the Constitution, it is nonetheless firmly entrenched in our
jurisprudence.8 8 To define its exact meaning and scope is difficult, per-
' Id. at 580-81.
16 370 U.S. 530 (1962).
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
"' 370 U.S. at 571.
"' The Draftsmen of the Constitution were evidently more concerned with providing the
states with immunity from certain types of suits in the federal courts. See THE FEDERALIST
No. 81, at 487-88 (A. Hamilton) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961); Principality of Monaco v. Missis-
sippi, 292 U.S. 313 (1934); Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1889).
The immunity doctrine has not prevented the United States from bringing suits against
states under the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. See United States v. Texas, 143
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haps impossible. At the very least, immunity appears to mean that the
federal government cannot be sued, either in federal or state courts, with-
out its consent, and that statutes giving such consent are to be strictly
construed.'54 It does not mean that agents of the federal government may
not be sued, although it is frequently difficult to distinguish when a suit
is really against the government even though nominally against an agent
of the government.'55 Numerous consent statutes exist; some of them, like
the Federal Torts Claims Act,' are limited in scope, while others, like
the Tucker Act' 57 which confers jurisdiction on the Court of Claims over
a variety of claims, are quite general.
The issue presented by the Williams decision is whether the doctrine of
federal government immunity from suit carries with it the implication
that Congress possesses greater powers with respect to claims against the
United States than it possesses with respect to other substantive legisla-
tion, and greater powers with respect to control over the creation and
jurisdiction of the inferior federal courts than it already otherwise pos-
sesses. Indeed, Justice Brennan acknowledged such an implication of the
sovereign immunity doctrine in his review of the so-called "public rights"
cases in the course of his opinion in the Marathon case.'58
Congress and the President have exclusive control over the enactment
of legislation, and only Congress can initiate legislation.' 59 The Constitu-
tion gives it the power to legislate, but does not require that it do so. If
Congress chose not to act, then there would be no national law except for
the Constitution of the United States and federal common law derived
U.S. 621 (1892). In addition, the Supreme Court has held that state immunity to suits in the
lower federal courts may be waived. See Parden v. Terminal Ry., 377 U.S. 184 (1964).
The opposite is not true. A state may not sue the United States in the Supreme Court
unless there has been consent to the suit by the government. Kansas v. United States, 204
U.S. 331 (1907). As is true in the case of individual actions against the national government,
the states may get around the immunity barrier in some cases by bringing the suit against a
federal government official. See Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970); South Carolina v.
Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966).
'6 See Basso v. United States, 239 U.S. 602 (1915); Dooley v. United States, 182 U.S. 222
(1901). See also HART & WECHSLER, supra note 42, at 1351.
In United States v. Mitchell, - U.S. __ , 103 S.Ct. 2961, 2965 (1983), the Supreme
Court stated: "It is axiomatic that the United States may not be sued without its consent
and that the existence of consent is a prerequisite for jurisdiction." The Court went on to
hold that the Tucker Act constitutes a waiver of sovereign immunity with respect to all
claims encompassed within the scope of that Act.
' See Hawaii v. Gordon, 373 U.S. 57 (1963).
'" See 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (1982).
'5 See 28 U.S.C. § 1346 (1976), amended by Federal Courts Improvement Act, § 129,
28 U.S.C. § 1346.
-___ U.S. at __ , 102 S.Ct. at 2869.
,' "All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United





from it.'60 If it chose not to create inferior federal courts, then there
would be no courts except for the Supreme Court of the United States
and the state courts. 6 ' It is difficult to imagine that Congress could pos-
sibly possess power broader than that, especially since it also has the
power to repeal any law it may choose to enact, so that the passage of a
particular piece of legislation does not bind its hands in the future. The
very act of creation of the new Claims Court and the abolition of the old
Court of Claims bears witness to the fact that the Congress is not bound
to perpetuate the national institutions it creates if it chooses not to do so.
One possible significance of the doctrine of sovereign immunity to fed-
eral jurisdiction can be imagined based on the following scenario: Assume
that Congress abolished all inferior federal courts, leaving only the state
courts and the Supreme Court of the United States, and that it likewise
repealed all statutes consenting to suits against the United States. If the
doctrine of sovereign immunity were strictly adhered to, neither the state
courts nor the Supreme Court of the United States would be able to en-
tertain a suit against the United States seeking redress for a violation by
the government of rights guaranteed by the Constitution. For instance, it
would appear that a claim for just compensation for the taking of private
property for public use in violation of the fifth amendment would be
blocked if the government did not expressly consent to its maintenance,
unless the litigant were able to cast the suit as one against an official of
the government and not as a suit against the government itself. Without
the doctrine of sovereign immunity, on the other hand, it would appear
that the state courts would have to entertain such a case because of the
supremacy clause of the Constitution;' 6 further, if the evidence estab-
lished such a taking, the plaintiff would be entitled to appropriate com-
pensation as a matter of federal (not state) common law.' 63 The United
States Supreme Court would have jurisdiction to review the case, unless
Congress by statute removed its appellate power over cases "arising
under" the United States Constitution, which would itself probably raise
a constitutional issue of considerable importance.'"
" "This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursu-
ance thereof ... shall be the supreme Law of the Land." U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
'6 "The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in
such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish." U.S.
CONST. art. III, § 1.
102 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
,' See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). See also Bell v. Hood,
327 U.S. 678 (1946) (permitting damages for injuries resulting from violations of the fourth
and fifth amendments). An analysis of the right to compensation in these cases as a matter
of federal common law is found in Katz, The Jurisprudence of Remedies: Constitutional
Legality and the Law of Torts in Bell v. Hood, 117 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (1968).
164 The appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court has been held to be entirely within
congressional control. Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1869). For a full discussion
of the constitutional issues surrounding this power, see Hart, The Power of Congress to
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Having imagined this extreme scenario, is it grounds for concluding
that the doctrine of sovereign immunity gives Congress such extraordi-
nary power over suits against the United States that it would be entitled
to entirely disregard the requirements of article III of the Constitution in
creating inferior courts to take jurisdiction over such suits? Since Con-
gress must pass laws in order to permit the government to be held ac-
countable in a judicial proceeding, may it, in so doing, ignore the provi-
sions of the Constitution that were designed to assure that federal judicial
proceedings would be free from political control? To grant that Congress
is free not to pass a law giving consent to suit really does not say much
more than that Congress is free not to pass any laws at all or that Con-
gress is free not to create any inferior federal courts at all. The reason or
logic of attaching tremendous additional congressional power over the
federal judicial system as an incident of a doctrine that can so easily be
waived if Congress feels that a legislative scheme would benefit from the
inclusion of judicially determinable remedies," 5 seems totally elusive.
Williams v. United States does not satisfactorily explain the connection.
If sovereign immunity from suit is a power regarded as residing in the
political branches of the national government, and not the judicial
branch, then it seems reasonable to conclude that it is another expression
of the constitutional separation of powers. It provides one more check on
the judicial power and serves to give the Congress and President yet an-
other means of limiting the jurisdiction of the inferior federal courts, a
means that merges into and becomes indistinguishable from the power to
legislate substantively, and the plenary power to control the lower federal
courts. It does not require the further destruction of the independence of
the federal judiciary assigned to try those cases against the government
which Congress and the president do see fit to allow, to protect the gov-
ernment against unwanted litigation. Indeed, it seems too high a price to
pay for this doctrine, which after all is not written into the Constitution,
to say that it gives Congress the power to override the express require-
ments of article III which give the judges of the Supreme and inferior
courts the protections designed to make them independent of the politi-
cal branches. The immunity doctrine should not be used as a pretext for
rendering express constitutional protections inoperative. It is not only the
Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts: An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 HARV. L. REV. 1362
(1953); see also HART & WECHSLER, supra note 42, at ch. IV and 1981 supp.
168 In Mitchell v. United States, __ U.S. -, 103 S. Ct. 2961 (1983), the Supreme
Court held unequivocally that the government has waived sovereign immunity to all suits
brought against it under the Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (1982) (originally enacted as Act
of March 3, 1887, ch. 359, 24 Stat. 505), or the Indian Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1505 (1982)
(originally enacted as Act of May 24, 1949, ch. 139, § 89(a), 63 Stat. 89, 102). The Mitchell
case was an action for damages in the Court of Claims brought by an Indian tribe and
individual tribe members seeking compensation for alleged government mismanagement of




judges concerned who benefit from article III protections: it is the integ-
rity and impartiality of the federal judicial process. Nowhere is that in-
tegrity and impartiality more needed than when the federal government
itself is a litigant. The government passes the laws and makes the rules to
guide judicial decisions; in many areas of government litigation, the rules
are already heavily weighted in the government's interest. It seems clear
that the Founding Fathers thought that at least the final judgment
should not be politically ordained.
In its rejection of the "public rights" doctrine as a viable basis for con-
gressional creation of non-article III courts, the dissenting opinion in
Marathon appears to have implicitly rejected the Williams v. United
States use of the doctrine of sovereign immunity from suit.' The "pub-
lic rights" doctrine is an offshoot of the sovereign immunity doctrine and
would seem to have no constitutional force without the foundation of sov-
ereign immunity.
The process of rejecting the analysis of the Williams case, as Justice
White's dissent points out, was begun by the Chief Justice Vinson in his
dissenting opinion in National Insurance Co. v. Tidewater Transfer
Co." 7 and was continued by Justice Harlan in his plurality opinion in
Glidden Co. v. Zdanok.' s Whether these differences with the decision in
Williams v. United States will lead the Court to reject the Williams ap-
plication of the sovereign immunity doctrine to enhance congressional
power over courts in the federal system remains to be seen. One can only
hope that the Supreme Court will not perpetuate a doctrine that has cre-
ated such analytical difficulties and that has contributed nothing to the
values served by the constitutional separation of powers.
The suggestion in Williams v. United States that the holding rested at
least in part on the belief that Congress possesses plenary authority over
all aspects of suits against the United States may be viewed indepen-
dently of the sovereign immunity doctrine with which it was linked in the
opinion. The underlying principle is that when the Constitution has ex-
pressly or by implication committed a matter to the sole discretion of one
of the political branches, the usual constitutional checks and balances are
not operative. This appears to be the justification for the "political ques-
tion" doctrine,'69 for one example, and for the holding that the guarantee
of a republican form of government in article IV, section 4 of the Consti-
I __ U.S. at -, 102 S.Ct. at 2883 (White, J., dissenting).
167 337 U.S. 582, 626 (1949) (Vinson, C.J., dissenting).
1" 370 U.S. 530 (1962). Justice Harlan openly rejected the Williams Court's application
of the sovereign immunity doctrine and contended that the Supreme Court had also re-
jected it on other occasions. His position was that the doctrine means only that the United
States must give its consent before it can be sued in the federal courts, but once this con-
sent is given, the judicial power of the United States as embodied in article III extends to
the controversy. Id. at 564.
' See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
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tution does not give rise to judicial questions, but only political ones. 70
In his plurality opinion in the Marathon case, Justice Brennan ex-
pressed the view that the Constitution similarly granted plenary govern-
mental authority to Congress over the military and hence the military
courts martial; over the territories, and hence over the territorial courts;
and over the District of Columbia, and hence over the court system of the
District of Columbia.' Although the dissenting Justices implicitly reject
this view, the fact that four Justices have adopted it as a justification for
permitting Congress to give the judicial power of the United States to
non-article III courts means that the adoption of a similar rationale by
the Supreme Court in the Williams case deserves careful consideration. If
a similar constitutional grant of exclusive congressional control can be
found respecting suits against the United States, the new Claims Court
could conceivably be justified on that ground, and it might succeed in
joining the ranks of the other courts above mentioned as a fourth major
exception to the presumptive applicability of article III requirements to
federal courts.
The constitutional basis for supposed plenary congressional authority
over suits against the United States is the power granted to Congress by
article I, section 8, clause 1 to pay the debts of the United States,'1 72 a
power that is linked to the taxing power and the power to spend "for the
general welfare." The generality of the language of this clause, together
with the fact that it appears in section 8 of article I which enumerates all
of Congress' legislative power, makes it difficult to accept the argument
that the clause embodies some extraordinary additional grant of authority
to Congress beyond the authority to legislate.
In his dissenting opinion in Marathon, Justice White criticizes the plu-
rality's view that the validity of the legislation creating the courts of the
District of Columbia is grounded on the constitutional commitment of all
the governmental affairs of the District of Columbia, precisely because
the clause referring to the government of the District is contained in sec-
tion 8, along with the enumeration of all of the other legislative powers of
Congress.' Carried to its logical conclusion, Justice White suggests, the
idea that a clause in section 8 grants such extraordinary authority to
Congress would provide a basis for Congress to ignore the limitations of
article III altogether whenever it wished to create a court to deal with
matters within the scope of its legislative power.'74 Justice Brennan and
the other members of the plurality would probably defend against such a
result by pointing to the language of the District of Columbia clause, arti-
170 See Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1 (1849).
__ U.S. at - , 102 S.Ct. at 2868.
'2 "The Congress shall have the Power to ... pay the Debts and provide for the com-
mon Defense and general Welfare of the United States." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.




cle I, section 8, clause 17, which in express terms gives Congress the
power "[tlo exercise exclusive Legislation in all Cases whatsoever" over
the seat of the national government-language that is far more specific
than the legislative power conferred by the other clauses.
In any event, it serves no useful purpose to suggest that the power to
pay the debts of the United States goes beyond the necessary power of
raising (through taxation legislation) and appropriating the money
needed for that purpose, and that it confers exceptional power on Con-
gress to ignore the requirements of article III in creating federal courts to
judicially determine controversies respecting those debts. Neither the
Court in Williams nor the Congress in enactment of the Claims Court
legislation suggested any such purpose. Since Congress has the power to
decide whether the federal government shall consent to suit, it seems un-
necessary to resort to the plenary authority doctrine and to give Congress
the additional power to decide that although such suits should be re-
solved by federal courts, those courts should not meet the standards of
independent judgment and impartiality specified in article III of the
Constitution.
IV. CONCLUSION
Apart from the issue of federal sovereign immunity, there is nothing in
the work of the United States Claims Court that would appear to justify
its status as an article I court. The work of the court is national in scope
and importance. The outcome of cases it hears is of obvious and direct
interest to both the executive and legislative branches of government. In-
deed, as defendant, the government has a special stake in the court's
judgments. Further, the court has jurisdiction over a variety of cases, in-
cluding claims for money judgments under the Constitution, contracts,
Indian claims, and tax and patent cases. If specialization is a feature that
warrants departure from the requirements of article 111,175 the Claims
Court does not appear to qualify." "
The issue of the constitutionality of the Claims Court under article III
was not debated in hearings on the Federal Courts Improvement Act;
while the House Report states that the constitutionality of the court was
considered, 1 7 if such consideration took place it was not regarded as im-
"7 Justice Brennan noted in Marathon that there had been rare circumstances where
Congress had found a particularized need in a specialized area that warranted distinctive
treatment. Id. at __, 102 S.Ct. at 2872.
' The House Report stated its view that the Claims Court was as specialized as the Tax
Court, and for that reason could be justified as a article I court. H.R. REP. No. 312, 97th
Cong., 1st Sess. 25 (1981). The Supreme Court has never ruled on the constitutionality of
the Tax Court. The court was held constitutional in Stix Friedman & Co. v. Coyle, 467 F.2d
474 (8th Cir. 1972).
177 The report asserted that in keeping with the independent and affirmative obligation of
Congress to determine the constitutionality of all legislation, the committee had concluded
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portant enough to warrant inclusion in published hearings or reports on
the legislation. Neither in the House nor in the Senate was the govern-
ment's practical need for a change in the court's status from article III to
article I considered. Indeed, the Bar Association of the District of Colum-
bia presented testimony urging that the court be made an article III
court for the practical reason that the security and prestige of article III
status was needed to secure qualified applicants willing to serve as
judges.17 The Association claimed that there was a serious problem in
finding qualified applicants to serve on article I tribunals. The change in
the court's status appears to have been made as a matter of legislative
convenience only: the major purpose behind the Federal Courts Improve-
ment Act was the creation of a new Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit, and the major reason for the creation of that new court was to
bring some uniformity to patent appeals. An examination of the legisla-
tive history reveals that this issue preoccupied the Congress. 7 ' Once the
decision was made to transform the Court of Claims and the Court of
Customs and Patent Appeals into the Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit, Congress was forced to do something to fill the void created with
respect to trial of suits against the government. Much of the existing in-
stitutional structure was left intact by transforming the hearing officers
of the Court of Claims into judges equipped with all the powers they held
previously along with all the powers the Court of Claims judges had pos-
sessed and a few additional powers conferred by the new legislation. By
legislatively elevating these former court appointees to the status of arti-
cle I judges, the Congress accomplished the most sweeping changes with
great efficiency, but with almost no expressed concern for the important
constitutional values that were affected by the changes.' 80 It would be
difficult to find in the legislative history of this Act any genuine support
for the idea that Congress acted as it did because of the nature of the
that "there is no constitutional objection to those reallocations." H.R. REP. No. 312, 97th
Cong., 1st Sess. 26 (1981).
178 Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1981-S.21 and State Justice Institute Act of
1981-S.537: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts of the Comm. on the Judiciary
United States Senate, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 242 (1981) (statement of Clarence T. Kipps, Bar
Association of D.C.) [hereinafter cited as Federal Courts Hearings].
17, See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 312, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 16-24, 28-30 (1981). Page references
to the United States Claims Court in the legislative history of the Act (and its predecessor
bills) are printed in the appendix to this article. The hearings before Senate and House
subcommittees contain no discussion of constitutional problems posed by the legislation. It
is possible that committee members and witnesses considered the issues settled as a result
of the passage of Tax Court, Bankruptcy Court, and U.S. Magistrates' legislation. There are
indications that some Congressmen and witnesses saw a degree of similarity between the
new Claims Court and the Tax Court. However, the House Report did reveal an awareness
of the existence of an issue relating to the constitutionality of the Claims Court temporary
appointments provisions. Unfortunately, a memorandum prepared for the Committee chair-
man on this issue, which is mentioned in the report, is not included in the printed hearings.




cases involved or because of some special legislative needs connected with
the work of the Claims Court.
One exception to the above critique, however, involves the matters that
Congress had referred to the Court of Claims in the past. In recent years
these reference matters have been given, not to the judges of the Court of
Claims, but to a special commissioner.'' Now, presumably, the judges of
the Claims Court will be able to handle these matters themselves, because
as article I judges they will no longer be bound by the justiciability limi-
tations of article III. This work of the court is a very small fraction of the
whole, 18 2 however, and is insufficient justification for another major ex-
ception to the requirements of article III.
There were undoubtedly many other constitutionally valid ways in
which Congress could have dealt with the matters involved in Claims
Court litigation. Congress might, for example, have distributed such mat-
ters to existing district court judges. For instance, the district courts al-
ready have jurisdiction over Tucker Act claims if the amount in contro-
versy does not exceed $10,000,183 yet it has always been unclear why their
jurisdiction was so limited. Moreover, the district courts already have ju-
risdiction over cases under the Federal Torts Claims Act and other cases
in which the United States is a defendant.18 4 The district courts do not
lack experience and competence to deal with the kinds of cases that fall
within the Claims Court's jurisdiction. The only good argument against
such a delegation is that it would add additional burdens to an already
overtaxed district court system.
A second solution might have been to make the Claims Court itself an
article III court, equal in rank to the district courts. The Court of Claims
was a strange hybrid court, apparently equal in rank to a circuit court of
appeals, 185 but possessing the responsibility of a trial court in many cir-
cumstances. 8 ' Congress might have streamlined its operations by making
it strictly a trial court without the necessity of transforming it into an
article I court.
A third possibility might have been to split off some of the court's
functions, making them resolvable by non-judicial means, although this
approach probably would have created more complications instead of
eliminating existing ones. Some matters, for example, might have been
delegated to administrative agencies, subject to judicial review at the ap-
pellate court level under the Administrative Procedure Act.1 8 7 Whether
'8, 28 U.S.C. § 1492 (1982).
,82 See Federal Courts Hearings, supra note 178, at 242. Justice Harlan made the same
point in his opinion in Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530, 583 (1962).
,83 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1982).
,84 Id. at 2674.
""' See generally id. ch. 7.
8 ld.
,8 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706 (1976). The sections allow for judicial review of administrative
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suits under the provisions of the fifth amendment could be converted into
a form suitable for administrative determination is debatable, but a posi-
tive outcome is not inconceivable since administrative agencies have been
known to make rulings on important constitutional issues.' Contract
cases might be difficult to manage in an administrative setting, but cer-
tainly would be amenable to arbitration by arbitrators acceptable to both
parties, subject again to the minimal judicial review that is customary in
federal contract cases. 189
It might be suggested that the admission that certain matters within
the jurisdiction of the Claims Court could be transferred to administra-
tive agencies (which are neither article I nor article III courts) or arbitra-
tors (who are neither article I nor article III judges) undermines the ar-
gument that Congress exceeded its authority in creating the Claims Court
as an article I court. Justice White's dissent might be interpreted as con-
taining such a suggestion, 90 but that would be to overlook the fact that
he, too, recognized constitutional limits to the power of Congress to by-
pass the requirements of article III and the values of separation of pow-
ers and judicial independence which article III embodies. He stated
clearly that the final judgement on the constitutionality of such legisla-
tion will be for the Court to make, 191 and it is clear that in such a review,
the mere legislative convenience of Congress, without more, will not be
sufficient to outweigh the values served by an independent judiciary. 19
To say that Congress is free to find alternatives to the judicial resolution
of disputes is not the same as saying that if it chooses to utilize the fed-
eral judicial process, it is free to ignore the protections the Constitution
provides against political influences or control over that process.
The net result of the passage of the Claims Court legislation is that
Congress has removed a broad range of cases of great importance to the
nation from the independent federal judicial system. Congress conferred a
significant portion of the judicial power of the United States on a federal
court subject to political control, including the power to render final judg-
ments and to enforce them with judicial process, as well as the ability to
use all of the powers of equity in deciding cases.
There is no evidence to suggest that this change resulted from open
agency actions. Congress did not give adequate consideration to this alternative. The Act
already provides review for administrative decisions in cases in which the United States is a
defendant. See Mulry v. Driver, 366 F.2d 544 (9th Cir. 1966); Carman v. Richardson, 357
F. Supp. 1148 (D. Vt. 1973).
' See St. Eliz. Com. Hosp. v. NLRB, 259 NLRB 1135 (1982).
189 See Copper Plumbing & Heating Co. v. Campbell, 290 F.2d 368 (D.C. Cir. 1961); see
also Scanwell Laboratories, Inc. v. Shaffer, 424 F.2d 859 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (appellant entitled
to judicial review for arbitrary and capricious contract bid decision).






hostility to the judiciary or to the doctrine of separation of powers, but
there is evidence that the change was made on the basis of a misconcep-
tion of the meaning of judicial independence. In the House Report on the
legislation, the comment was made that the elevation of Court of Claims
hearing officers to judgeships on the new Claims Court would be effica-
cious because it would free them from dependence on the judges who had
appointed them.'9 3 Obviously the Representatives did not stop to reflect
that the independence guaranteed by article III of the Constitution is in-
dependence of the judges from the influence or control of the political
branches of government, not from the judicial branch.
It would be salutary if Congress itself would re-evaluate its creation,
putting the Claims Court legislation back on the drafting table for a more
thoughtful examination of the problems it poses for the constitutional
separation of powers, as well as the practical desirability of having a truly
independent judiciary decide cases brought against the government of the
United States. Congress could at the same time examine alternative
means for handling the business of the court. Admittedly it has not been
an easy matter for Congress to understand precisely what powers it does
and does not possess vis-a-vis the federal court system, but the Marathon
case has once again made clear that there are constitutional limitations
on Congress' powers and that these limitations will be enforced even
years after the fact, creating a situation of great uncertainty and confu-
sion for those who must resort to the courts.
193 H.R. REP. No. 312, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 25 (1981).
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APPENDIX
REFERENCES TO UNITED STATES CLAIMS COURT IN LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
Chronologically listed, 1977 to 1982
SOURCE
State of the Judiciary and Ac-
cess to Justice: Hearings Before
the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Lib-
erties, and the Admin. of Justice of
the House Comm. on the Judici-
ary, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (June 20,
1977).
SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY,
FEDERAL COURTS IMPROVEMENT ACT
OF 1979, S. 1477, 96th Cong., 1st
Sess.
Federal Courts Improvement Act
of 1979: Hearings on S. 677, S. 678
Before the Subcomm. on Improve-
ments in Judicial Machinery of
the Senate Comm. on the Judici-
ary, 96th Cong., 1st Sess.
HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY,
COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FED-
ERAL CIRCUIT ACT OF 1980, H.R.
3806, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980).
Federal Courts Improvement Act
of 1979: Addendum to Hearings on
S. 677, S. 678 Before the Subcomm.
on Improvements in Judicial Ma-
chinery of the Senate Comm. on
the Judiciary, 96th Cong., 1st Sess.
Industrial Innovation and Pat-
ent and Copyright Law Amend-
ments: Hearings on H.R. 6033,
6934, 3806, 2414 Before the Sub-
comm. on Courts, Civil Liberties,
and the Admin. of Justice of the
House Comm. on the Judiciary,
96th Cong., 2d Sess.
LOCATION
Not specifically directed
United States Claims Court,
see pages 235-39.
Pages 8, 29-39.
Pages 5, 32, 39, 61, 79-84, 91-92,
98-100, 104-06, 111, 117, 124, 309-
442 (S. 677), 461, 506, 509-14, 519-
23, 560-62, 633, 642-43, 669.
Pages 1-15 (H.R. 3806), 22-24,
26-28, 30, 32-33, 36-43, 45-46, 50-
51, 59-62, 68-75, 78-84, 86, 88, 91-
98, 100, 102-04, 106-07, 110, 113-16,
118-29, 131.
Pages 17, 28, 45, 82-87.





HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY,
COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FED-
ERAL CIRCUIT ACT OF 1981, H.R.
4482, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981).
Additional Judicial Positions:
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Courts of the Senate Comm. on the
Judiciary, 97th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1981).
Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit and United States Claims
Court: Hearings on H.R. 2405
Before the Subcomm. on Courts,
Civil Liberties, and the Admin. of
Justice of the House Comm. on the
Judiciary, 97th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1981).
Federal Courts Improvement Act
of 1981 and Senate Justice Insti-
tute Act of 1981: Hearings on S. 21,
S. 537 Before the Subcomm. on the
Judiciary, 97th Cong., 1st Sess.
(May 18, 1981).
SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY,
FEDERAL COURTS IMPROVEMENT ACT
OF 1981, S. 1700, 97th Cong., 1st
Sess.
127 CONG. REC. 168, H8383-92
(daily ed. Nov. 17, 1981).
127 CONG. REC. 169, H8442-43
(daily ed. Nov. 18, 1981).
127 CONG. REC. 182, S14683-723
(daily ed. Dec. 8, 1981).
128 CONG. REC. 22, H737-47
(daily ed. Mar. 9, 1982).
128 CONG. REC. 29, S2567 (daily
ed. Mar. 22, 1982).
Pages 1-16 (H.R. 4482), 17, 24-27,
32-40, 42-53, 57-58, 67-71, 77-85,
87, 89-95, 97, 99-101, 104-10, 112-
13, 115-17, 119-24, 127-30, 132-43,
145.
Pages 123-26.
Pages 18, 20, 25, 27-35, 37-40, 16-
67, 211-13, 214, 229, 424, 427, 536,
538-41, 544-53, 555, 558-69, 571-73,
575-78, 580-82, 741.
Pages 1, 2-71 (S. 21), 139-40, 154,
235, 239-42, 273, 276-79, 281-88.
Pages 2, 7, 13, 15-18, 22-25, 32-
33.
Page H8390. Discussion of bill.
No discussion of Claims Court.
Passage by the House of amended
bill (321-76).
Pages S14692-94, 14709, 14721.
Discussion of bill.
Introduction of bill into record.
Presentation to the Senate of
amendment to the Act.
1983-841
47Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1983
48https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol32/iss1/8
